



KARL E. KLARE -
Legal discourse shapes our beliefs about the experiences and
capacities of the human species, our conceptions of justice, freedom
and fulfillment, and our visions of the future. It informs our
beliefs about how people learn about and treat themselves and
others, how we come to hold values, and how we might construct
the institutions through which we govern ourselves. In these re-
spects legal discourse resembles all other forms of systematized
symbolic interaction. The peculiarity of legal discourse is that it
tends to constrain the political imagination and to induce belief
that our evolving social arrangements and institutions are just and
rational, or at least inevitable, and therefore legitimate. The modus
operandi of law as legitimating ideology is to make the historically
contingent appear necessary. The function of legal discourse in
our culture is to deny us access to new modes of conceiving of
democratic self-governance, of our capacity for and the experience
of freedom. Legal discourse inhibits the perception that we have
it in our power to alter and abolish existing patterns of domination
and denial of human potential. It is, in short, the vocation of legal
thought to render radical, nonliberal visions of freedom literally
inconceivable."
The purpose of this Article is to illustrate and defend my
claims regarding the ideological functions of legal discourse by
focusing on the treatment of the public/private distinction in con-
temporary labor law.2 The field of labor law presents us with a
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1 This is not to deny that legal discourse can also be a repository of emanci-
patory values and aspirations. See E.P. THOmPSON, WIGs AND HUNTERS 258-69
(1975). See generally Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the
Eighteenth Century, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 1971, at 76 (arguing that rural food
riots responded not merely to economic distress but also to a popular consensus
that speculative grain marketing practices violated social and legal norms).
2The phrase "public/private distinction" has several distinct connotations.
For example, it is used to refer to the difference between "open" and "intimate"--
the key issue being "privacy." A second connotation is the difference between the
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rich lode to mine because public/private, rhetoric is pervasive 'in
the adjudication of workplace disputes. The public/private dis-
tinction recurs not just as a background motif but very often as an
essential ingredient of the grounds of decision. Indeed, courts and
commentators often speak as though resolution of labor law prob-
lems would be impossible without a conceptual apparatus for dis-
tinguishing between public and private.
This is not surprising. The leading theorists of collective
bargaining law have in large part based their work on an analogy
between governance of -the workplace and governance of society.3
This way of thinking has naturally inclined labor lawyers to import
the vocabulary of constitutionalism into their work. Analogizing
collective bargaining to lawmaking 4 and treating collectively bar-
gained plant operating procedures as an "industrial rule of law" .
caused the reproduction within labor law of the categories, prob-
lems, and inflections of liberal theory. Conversely, as I have argued
elsewhere,7 labor law registers the convergence in the liberal imagi-
nation of the politics of class struggle and the theory of the state.
world of work and government and the world of social life and family. This usage
has been a focus of much attention in recent feminist writing, a key issue being
sexism in the social division of labor. "Public/private" is also used to distinguish
that which affects and concerns others and that which is "personal." Here the
key issue is "regulation." The most important usage in labor law, and in 'the
liberal political tradition generally, has to do with the distinction between the state
and civil society. This is the sense in which the phrase is used throughout most
of this Article.
3 See generally Kare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography
of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDus. REL. L.J. 450, 458-80 (1981); Lynd,
Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDus.
REL. L.J. 483, 486-93 (1981); Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1514-15, 1544-65, 1573-77 (1981).
4 See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt. 1),
61 -ALv. L. REv. 1, 1 (1947):-
In annual conferences, the employer and the union representing the em-
ployees, in addition to fixing wage rates, write a basic statute for the
government of an industry or plant .... By this "collective bargaining"
the employee shares through his chosen representatives in fixing the
conditions under which he works, and a rule of the law is substituted for
absolute authority.
5 See id.; see also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 579 (1960) (the collective bargaining agreement "calls into being a new
common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant");
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Hnv. L. Rxv. 999,
1002-16 (1955) (collective bargaining agreement establishes private rule of law
in workplace).
6 For a general description and criticism of the tradition of liberal political
theory, particularly in relation to jurisprudential issues, see R. UNGERz, KNOWVLEDGE
AND'Porrcs 63-103 (1975). For a discussion of the relationship of contemporary
labor law to issues in liberal political thought, see Kare, supra note- 3, at 455-68.
7' See generally Klare, supra note 3.
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A unique form of applied political theory, the philosophy of col-
lective bargaining law has emerged since the 1930s as an important
effort, to conceptualize and justify government's regulatory role in
advanced industrial society. For these reasons labor law provides a
novel and promising setting in which to study the vagaries of pre-
eminent liberal formulations like the public/private distinction.
For the most part the terms "public" and "private" will be
used in this Article simply as they appear in the cases and doctrinal
literature. However, these terms have several distinct if related
and overlapping meanings, and this Article will be primarily con-
cerned with the formulation that focuses on distinguishing between
the "political" and "socio-economic" domains of life.8
Part I provides an overview of some specific doctrinal examples
of the public/private distinction in labor law. Part II offers a more
detailed examination of a particular problem, namely the various
appearances of the public/private distinction in the theory of the
collective bargaining and grievance processes. Parts I and II will
attempt to establish that although public/private rhetoric is perva-
sive in labor doctrine, it is devoid of significant, determinate ana-
lytical content. Specifically, the Article will demonstrate the in-
coherence of the public/private distinction by showing that: (i) the
distinct designations "public" and "private" are at different times,
or even simultaneously, employed to characterize the same phe-
nomena; 9 (ii) judges and other legal thinkers beginning from an
identical premise about the "publicness" or "privateness" of a par-
ticular phenomenon will arrive at sharply contrasting or opposed
legal conclusions regarding it; or, beginning from opposed premises
they will arrive at identical legal conclusions; 10 and (iii) most im-
portant, the "borderline" dividing "public" and "private" is con-
stantly being altered and redefined in the presence of new legal
problems, but absent significant changes in the nature of the under-
lying phenomena or social forces that the labels "public" and
"private" supposedly describe."
8 See supra note 2.
9 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 23-30 (authorities differ over whether
arbitrators dispense public or private law); infra text accompanying notes 49-67
(authorities differ over whether unions are public or private entities).
39See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 72-83 (same results in dues ex-
penditure cases can be justified from each of two opposite initial positions on the
public/private question).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 120-242 (history of arbitration in col-
lective bargaining law reveals gradual evolution through which the employer's
response to worker grievances shifted from the zone of private prerogative into the
zone of public interest).
Overall, the several examples contained in Part I and the ex-
tended review of one issue in Part II are intended to suggest that
it is seriously mistaken to imagine that legal discourse or liberal
political theory contains a core conception of the public/private
distinction capable of being filled with determinate content or ap-
plied in a determinate manner to concrete cases. There is no
"public/private distinction." What does exist is a series of ways of
thinking about public and private that are constantly undergoing
revision, reformulation, and refinement. The law contains a set of
imageries and metaphors, more or less coherent, more or less prone
to conscious manipulation, designed to organize judicial thinking
according to recurrent, value-laden patterns. The public/private
distinction poses as an analytical tool in labor law, but it functions
more as a form of political rhetoric used to justify particular results.
Part III explores the apologetic character of public/private
discourse in labor law, discussing three particular sets of political
values that are contained in and reinforced by contemporary
public/private rhetoric about the workplace. It argues that the
use of such rhetoric obscures rather than illuminates, and that the
social function of the public/private distinction is to repress aspira-
tions for alternative political arrangements by predisposing us to
regard comprehensive alternatives to the established order as absurd.
I. THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE PUBLIC/PRiVATE DISTINCTION
IN LABOR LAW
The public/private distinction is a central category in many
areas of labor doctrine. Contemporary legal thinkers are riveted
to the idea that they can determine many rights and duties of the
contending parties in the workplace by proper application of the
labels "public" and "private." On the other hand, many existing
and respected analyses of the workplace draw the public/private
boundary line at different locations. Commentators share a com-
fortable and usually unexamined consensus that the public/private
distinction is meaningful, that certain legal consequences must
follow from designating a particular aspect of workplace life either
"public" or "private." Yet the same thinkers frequently and mark-
edly disagree over what the public/private distinction means and
over which label is correct for many different aspects of the work-
place. Moreover, it is a typical pattern that an author's analysis
and arguments for classifying something as either "public" or "pri-
vate" are promptly disregarded or forgotten, though they are
equally germane, when the next item is under discussion.
1982.1 LABOR LAW 1361
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The easy consensus on the meaningfulness of the public/private
distinction, coupled with total chaos regarding its application to
specific instances, gives rise to the suspicion that the distinction is
not an analytical tool but an after-the-fact rhetorical device used to
justify political conclusions. Analysts seeking to expand employee
rights vis-a-vis the employer generally do so by appealing to the
public character of the subject under discussion, but the contortions
of public/private analysis are sufficiently complex that this will not
always be true. Few labor law analysts ever examine the conceptual
validity of the public/private distinction itself. There is apparently
a political value in clinging to the distinction, even if there is no
common ground on what it means.
The following examples are primarily intended to convey a
sense of the frequency, range, and ingenuity with which the dis-
tinction is deployed. They are presented in an order ranging from
the more straightforward to the more complex. The discussion is
not concerned with justifying or criticizing public intervention in
particular cases. Rather, its purpose is to show the conceptual
inadequacies and, ultimately, the ideological content of this way of
thinking about workplace issues.
A. Is the Employment Contract (in the "Private Sector")
Affected with a Public Interest or Is It Simply
a Private Relationship?
At common law, the private sector employment contract is
deemed an essentially private arrangement. A corollary of this
view is that, absent explicit contrary contractual guarantees, em-
ployment may ordinarily be terminated at will for a good reason, a
bad reason, or no reason at all.12 One of the most significant recent
common law developments, however, is that several jurisdictions
have begun to modify this rule by judicial decision. Either as a
matter of tort or contract, a growing number of states now forbid
the discharge of an employee at will for a reason that contravenes
public policy.' 3 The result is that the private contract of employ-
12 See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limit-
ing the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rtv. 1404 (1967);
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118 (1976); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974).
's Leading cases include Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,
610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (holding that when the discharge of an
employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the employee may main-
tain an action in tort; dismissal for refusal to participate in retail price-fixing
[Vol. 130:1358
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ment is no longer deemed entirely private. Public law norms are
implied into the relationship as restrictions upon the employer's
power to discharge. 14 This emergent trend illustrates the way that
the boundaries of the public/private distinction are shifted without
any relevant change in the underlying sociology of the employment
relationship.
A curious counterpoint to this developing perception that the
private employment relationship is affected with a public interest
is found in the expansion and continuing vitality of the so-called
"indefensible disloyalty" doctrine. While employees who engage
in concerted workplace activity ordinarily can claim the protection
of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),15 under
this doctrine employee concerted activity loses statutory protection
if it is "indefensibly disloyal," "disruptive," or "irresponsible." 16
scheme); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980) (recognizing cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge where the dis-
charge contravenes a clear mandate of public policy; retaliatory dismissal of em-
ployee who insisted that employer comply with state Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (cause of action
in tort for wrongful discharge; dismissal in retaliation for, employee's efforts to have
the bank comply with consumer credit protection laws); Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (unjust dismissal may consti-
tute breach of implied covenant of good faith in employment contract; termination
designed to prevent salesman from collecting earned bonuses); Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (holding that discharge for a
reason that contravenes public policy is breach of implied covenant in employment
contract; discharge of employee for refusing to accede to supervisor's sexual
advances).
14 In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the
employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced
against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and
the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance betveen the two ....
We hold that a termination by the employer of a contract of employment
at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation
is not [in] the best interest of the -economic system or the public good
and constitutes a breach of the employment contract.
Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551 (emphasis added).
This language could be read to imply that any bad faith termination contra-
venes the public good. Alternatively, it could be interpreted to mean that in order
to show a breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith, the employee
must show that the dismissal was for a reason that contravenes public policy. This
ambiguity was subsequently resolved in favor of the latter interpretation. Howard
v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980) ("We con-
strue Monge to apply only to a situation where an employee is discharged because
he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that
which public policy would condemn."). See also Cloutier v. Great Ad. & Pac.
Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 920, 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (1981) (Dorr Woolen limited
Monge to cases involving dismissals for reasons that contravene public policy).
1529 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) ("[e]mployees shall have the right . . . to engage
in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection").
10 The leading case is NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346
U.S. 464 (1953). For recent discussions, see, e.g., Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. NLRB,
1363
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The curious twist is that in the context of the heavily regulated
collective bargaining relationship, as to which the public's interest
is well established, 17 decisionmakers have substantially relied on
private law norms to interpret the public regulatory scheme, dilut-
ing statutory guarantees.
The leading case in this area involved employees who, in the
course of a labor dispute with a publicly licensed TV station, chose
to center their propaganda on alleged deficiencies in their em-
ployer's service to the public rather than on their private, employ-
ment-related claims.' 8 The quality of a public licensee's service is,
of course, a matter in the public domain. As citizens and as mem-
bers of the "public," these employees had an unquestioned right
to discuss the station's service and, indeed, to attack the "public
policies of the company." 19 As employees, however, they were not
acting as members of the public but rather in a private capacity,
subject always to "contractual bonds and loyalties" 210 to the em-
ployer. The Supreme Court found that the private law rule that
"disloyalty is adequate cause for discharge"21 provides a sufficient
basis to extinguish the public law employee right to engage in
concerted activity. Likewise, the Court concluded that disparage-
ment of the employer's product-even by way of truthful criticism
or by way of opinion designed to assist the public in assessing the
performance of its licensee-is an act of disloyalty warranting dis-
charge.
22
663 F.2d 455, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1981) (Garth, J., concurring); G.T.A. Enters., Inc.,
260 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (1982). This doctrine is patently incoherent. The very
purpose of some conventional forms of concerted workplace protest, like strikes, is
to disrupt the employer's business. Most forms of concerted activity can be said
to constitute acts of disloyalty toward the policies of the employer. In practice
the doctrine singles out for condemnation certain forms of worker protest not be-
cause they are especially disloyal or indefensible, but because they are unusually
effective. See, e.g., Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND.
L.J. 319, 338-39 (1951) (slowdowns and similar tactics unprotected by NLRA
because "such weapons are too effective to permit them to be part of the em-
ployees' arsenal").
1729 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) ("[ilt is declared to be the policy of the United
States to . . . encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
[to protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association [and] self-or-
ganization").




22Id. 477. Cf. Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1629 (1956)
("[sitatements made by employees to the public which deliberately cast discredit
upon their employer's product or service are no less disloyal and a breach of con-
fidence because they are truthful").
[Vol. 130:1358
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B. Do Labor Arbitrators Dispense "Public Law"
or "Private Law"?
This is a perennial and hotly debated issue in the labor field,
A typical form of the debate revolves around the question whether
arbitrators may, should, or must resolve grievances in light of legal
norms "external" to the parties' contract, that is, in light of public
law rules such as the equal employment provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.23 Opinion on this question ranges across a
very broad spectrum: 24
(1) Professor Feller's view is that the arbitrator should never
follow rules derived from law external to the collective bargaining
agreement (in the event of conflict between public law and con-
tractual norms). He believes that the arbitrator performs within
and is responsible to an autonomous system of industrial self-
government and private law established by labor and management.2
From this perspective it follows that the arbitral system performs
an indispensable role in the public management of industrial con-
flict. Feller concludes, therefore, that as a matter of public law
arbitral decisions administering the parties' private law system
should be granted a special deference by the courts, akin to the
full faith and credit owed the judgments of foreign jurisdictions.
26
(2) A related but somewhat different perspective is Professor
St. Antoine's view that the arbitrator is merely the parties' official
"contract reader." For that reason, St. Antoine argues, arbitrators
should follow the contract despite a conflict with public law.27  He
concludes, however, that because the arbitrator's role is to fill out
the parties' agreement, arbitral awards are not entitled to any formal
judicial deference regarding the lawfulness of the conduct they
23 Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Title VII prohibits employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2.
24The debate over the status of arbitral law illustrates the stage in the history
of legal thought Professor Kennedy calls "continuumization." Kennedy, The Stages
of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinct;*on, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1352
(1982).
25 See generally Feller, The Coming End of Arbitratiors Golden Age, 29 NAT'L
AcAD. AB. 97 (1976); id. 107 ("the very special status that courts have awarded
arbitrators... derives from a... recognition that arbitration is not a substitute for
judicial adjudication, but a part of a system of industrial self-governance").
2 6 Feller, supra note 25, at 107.
27 St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look
at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 1137, 1138-44 (1977);
cf. id. 1155 ("an arbitrator confronted with an irreconcilable conflict between the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement and the apparent requirements of statu-
tory or decisional law should follow the contract and ignore the law").
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command.28 Thus, while both Feller and St. Antoine agree that
the arbitrator fills out a system of private law, they reach opposite
conclusions as to whether that private law system performs a suffi-
ciently significant public function so as to earn the status of a species
of public law to which courts must defer.
(3) Moving to the middle of the spectrum, we find many com-
mentators who, for different reasons and with varying degrees of
enthusiasm, call for explicit arbitral responsiveness to the commands
of public law.2 Implicit in these middle-range positions is the
assumption that arbitral law is woven into the fabric of a general
system of law governing the workplace.
(4) Finally there is an extreme position, seriously proposed
although not reached for decision by Judge Lumbard in a leading
case: the view "that since the arbitrator is an instrument of national
labor policy, he is not a mere 'private' person, but rather one act-
ing on behalf of the government who must take into account [em-
ployees' constitutional] rights." 30 The logic of this view is to break
down entirely the distinction between public and private law and
to regard private arbitrators as governmental officials.
C. Is the (Private Sector) Workplace a "Public" or
a "Private" Place?
This area provides a classic illustration of the inconsistent
application of the labels "public" and "private." Discussion of the
public or private character of the workplace often turns on the
question of ownership,3 1 and the typical assumption is that the
28 Id. 1150 ("when a court declines to enforce an arbitral award that violates
law or public policy, it does not question the veracity of the arbitrator's reading of
the contract; it rules that the contract as read is unenforceable"); cf. id. 1150-61.
29 See, e.g., Getman, What Price Employment? Arbitration, The Constitution,
and Personal Freedom, 29 NAT'L AcAD. AnB. 61 (1976); Howlett, The Arbitrator,
the NLRB, and the Courts, 20 NAT'L AcAD. Ann. 67 (1967); Mittenthal, The Role
of Law in Arbitration, 21 NAT'L AcAD. Ann. 42 (1968); Sovern, When Should
Arbitrators Follow Federal Law?, 23 NAT'L ACAD. Ann. 29 (1970).
30 Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 204 n.12 (D. Conn. 1974),
modified, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
3 1 It is often assumed that determinate, specifiable consequences flow from
the demarcation between public and private ownership, but this is plainly false.
Consider, for example, the legal treatment of parks and thoroughfares. The modem
view is that if they are publicly owned, the first amendment prevents regulation of
speech thereon except in narrow circumstances and then only on a content-neutral
basis. See L. TRImE, AmmucAN CONSTrnTUONAL LAW 688-93 (1978). On the
other hand, a private owner of such spaces is, with certain exceptions, privileged
to exclude speech on any basis, including its content, or on no basis. See Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Until relatively recently, however, the view
was that government had the prerogatives of a private owner and therefore could
exclude expressional activity in public places. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis,
[Vol. 130:1358
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private sector workplace is the property of the employer.32  Al-
though employees heavily invest their "human capital" in the
enterprise for which they work, they do not thereby ordinarily ac-
quire any "property interest" in it.33 Modern legal scholarship,
however, demonstrates that the concept of "private property" is
really an emblem for "the conclusion that certain patterns of be-
havior are to be enforced between people for the benefit of society
as a whole." - Even a partial survey of the conventional indicia
of property, ownership suggests that the patterns of behavior en-
forced by law in the workplace are ambiguous, contradictory, and
riddled with exceptions. This casts doubt upon the simplistic as-
sumption that the employer owns the workplace.
1. Power to Exclude
One of the bundle of rights usually thought to be associated
with private property ownership is the power to exclude unwanted
visitors and activities. The employer's power to exclude in the
private sector workplace, however, is subject to substantial excep-
tions. The NLRA recognizes a public interest in permitting on-
premises leafletting through which workers can educate each other
on matters of mutual concern, including matters in the public
domain outside the scope of the private employment relationship.3 5
162 Mass: 510, 511 (1895) (Holmes, J.) (for government "absolutely or con-
ditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a
private house to forbid it in his house"), aff'd sub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
U.S. 43 (1897). See generally Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE PoirrIcs OF
LAw 140, 142-44 (Kairys ed. 1982); Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare
Benefits, in ThE Pora'rcs OF LAw, supra, at 262, 265-68.
32 1 assume for purposes of discussion that there is some meaningful sense in
which to speak of corporate property as "private property." Professor Frug has
demonstrated that "developments in the twentieth century have significantly under-
mined the 'privateness' of major business corporations, with the result that the
traditional bases for distinguishing them from public corporations have largely
disappeared." Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Hazv. L. REv. 1057, 1129
(1980); see also id. 1128-41.
33 See, e.g., United Steel Workers, Local No. 1330 v. United States Steel
Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded
in part, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980) (neither employees nor local community
have a property right in steel plant sufficient to bar plant closedown).
34 Comment, Unemployment As A Taking Without Compensation, 43 S. CAL.
L. REv. 488, 490 (1970). See also Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9
RuTGER Rs L. REv. 357, 373-74 (1954) (private property defined as certain patterns
of human interaction underwritten by public power); Hamilton, Property-Ac-
cording to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 879 (1932) (property "is but a name for a
cluster of prevailing usages ...which binds the individual to the social order").
35 See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1976) (employees may distribute
union leaflets discussing both collective bargaining and general political matters on
employer's premises). The source of this right is § 7 of the NLRA. The public
1982]
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We could think of this public interest as creating an easement for
the purpose of protected leafletting on the property of the employer,
but it makes equal sense to say that the employer's and the public's
rights in the property are defined so as to include expressional
access.a6 Employees are thus statutorily guaranteed the right to
engage in certain forms of on-premises leafletting and other com-
munication (for example, wearing union buttons).8 7 To this extent
employers are forbidden to deploy their authority and power as
owners to interfere with the use of the workplace for the conduct of
such activity.38  The law recognizes that the workplace is uniquely
suited to communicative interaction between employees, that it is
interest in guaranteeing expressional access may not extend to mutual education of
workers on "purely political" matters, overly "remote" from the interests of em-
ployees as employees. Id. 567-68. That is, the public interest in on-premises
worker education is circumscribed by the horizons of private self-interest; it is
not so expansive as to encompass the entirety of concerns reposing in the public
domain. By "employee as employee" the law evidently means something less
than employee as citizen or community-member. See supra text accompanying
notes 15-22. See generally K. MAax, On the Jewish Question, in EARY WmiT-
rCs 211 (R. Livingstone & G. Benton trans. 1975) (social and institutional life
in capitalist society fractures the personality between bourgeois and citoyen).
36 Indeed, at one point certain private workplaces, notably shopping centers,
were deemed akin to "public places . . . historically associated with the exercise
of First Amendment rights." Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Val-
ley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968). See generally id. 315-20. Logan
Valley was overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Hudgens
seemingly leaves open whether certain locations other than shopping centers may,
even though privately owned, so closely resemble public space historically dedi-
cated to first amendment expression that use of such locations is governed by the
Constitution. A number of state courts have relied on free speech provisions in
their own state constitutions to enforce a public right of access to certain kinds of
private property, including shopping centers. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), af'd,
447 U.S. 74 (1980) (shopping center); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d
615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 102 S. Ct. 867
(1982) (private university campus).
3 The primary source of employee leafletting and solicitation rights is § 7 of
the NLRA. See generally R. Gosu.s' , BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 179-94 (1976).
3S In special circumstances the § 7 right of access to the employer's property,
and the consequent limitation on the employer's power to exclude, extends to non-
employees (such as professional union organizers). R. GoRNLA , supra note 37,
at 185-87.
Under prevailing doctrine, the NLRB is required to "strike a balance between
the interests of the employer-which are not specifically accorded weight in the
statute but which Congress surely intended be considered in administering a statute
designed to further industrial peace and efficiency-and the interests of employees
in a free decision concerning their collective bargaining activities." Id. 133. This
doctrine undermines the goals of the statute. Under a preferable approach the
Board would give meaning to § 7 by determining an optimal level of organizational
activity in the workplace consistent with the statute's goals and without respect to
whether contrary employer interests are infringed.
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their natural forum for job-related and other forms of public
expression.
39
2. Rights of Privacy 4
0
The traditional view is that the institution of private property
is a shield against public power which, among other things, can
create for the owner the benefits of a physical and psychological
zone of privacy. In what may be an exquisite example of Professor
Kennedy's "loopification," 41 however, workers now look to public
power for protection of their privacy rights from the institution of
private property. There is increasing support for the proposition
that the public has an interest worthy of legal recognition in creat-
ing zones of privacy for employees on the employer's private
property and within the employment relationship. For example,
many states have statutes regulating the collection, use, and dis-
closure by employers of personal information on employees.
42
Similarly, arbitral authority supports employees' rights to privacy
in their lockers and handbags, as well as on their persons.
43
3. Uses of the Private Workplace
Private property is ordinarily viewed as an instrument of pri-
vate ends, yet the workplace is also sometimes deemed a preeminent
39 Cf. Gale Prod. Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249
(1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964):
Their place of work is the one location where employees are brought
together on a daily basis. It is the one place where they clearly share
common interests and where they traditionally seek to persuade fellow
workers in matters affecting their union organizational life and other mat-
ters related to their status as employees.
This passage is quoted with approval in Eastex, 437 U.S. at 574, and NLRB v.
Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 323-24 (1974).
40 In addition to the types of privacy rights discussed in this paragraph, the
concept of privacy has also been seen as the source of rights to free choice in the
workplace regarding the development and expression of one's personality. An
example is the derivation from constitutional privacy doctrine of a principle of
nondiscrimination in public employment on account of sexual preference. See
infra text accompanying notes 119-27.
41 Kennedy, supra note 24, at 1354.
42 A recent Bureau of National Affairs survey discloses that 33 states have such
laws. Legislation on Workers' Privacy, 109 LAB. REL. BRmT. (BNA) 8-13 (Jan. 4,
1982).
43 See F. EL.ounl & E. Er.ounr, How ArrriAToN Wombs 727-33 (3d ed.
1973). In a similar vein, 17 states and the District of Columbia prohibit employers
from requiring employees or prospective employees to submit to a lie detector test
as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment. Legislation on Workers'
Privacy, supra note 42, at 11-12. See also Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (discharge of employee at will for refusal to submit
to polygraph examination gives rise to tort action for wrongful discharge).
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instrumentality for accomplishing the goals of public policy, such
as economic planning. For example, recently Detroit condemned
the homes and neighborhood of elderly workers and donated the
property to the General Motors Corporation for construction of a
new plant. The city's purpose was to alleviate unemployment and
fiscal distress. The Supreme Court of Michigan held, as it was re-
quired to do in order to validate the transaction, that the con-
demnation was "for the primary benefit of the public [not that of]
the private user." 4
We know, then, that a large corporate employer like General
Motors exists by virtue of public law; it is heavily subsidized by the
public; it is a prime instrument of public policy and planning; it
is entangled in countless ways in public regulatory schemes; it has
the power to tax the public by charging administered prices
sheltered by tepid interpretations of the antitrust laws; its space is
open to use by others to promote collective bargaining and other
ideological causes to which GM might be deeply opposed; govern-
ment purchasing puts money in its coffers; it uses the mass media
to mold the public's tastes and "preferences"; and its every whim is
Detroit's desire.
Curiously, the law persists in treating such an entity as "private."
Thus, to protect the employer's "privacy interests" the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration must have a search war-
rant to conduct routine, prophylactic safety inspections that might
save the lives or limbs of workers who pass their days upon the
employer's private commercial property. 5 The employer is per-
mitted to treat off-duty employees as though they were nonemployee
strangers in administering the rules regarding access to premises, 46
a doctrine that undermines the recognition of the workplace as the
natural forum for communication between workers. The em-
ployer's authority to manage the work process and to make invest-
ment decisions falls within a tenaciously protected realm of private
prerogative, one largely exempted fronf the inroads of collective
44 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 617, 304
N.W.2d 455, 459 (1981) (emphasis added). In a remarkable passage, citing an
earlier dictum of Justice Cooley, the court stated: "When there is [a] public need
[which is otherwise impracticable], [tihe abstract right [of an individual] to make
use of his own property in his own way is compelled to yield to the general comfort
and protection of community, and to proper regard to relative rights in others."
Id. 459 (citation omitted.).
45 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.,307 (1978).
46See Tri-County Medical Center, 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976); GTE Lenkurt,
Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973).
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bargaining law.47 American law recognizes no property interest of
employees or of the surrounding community in the disposition
of the employer's capital.48
. Thus, while in many aspects we acknowledge the public char-
acter of the workplace, particularly when we come to questions
involving the allocation of resources the "privateness". of the work-
place is reasserted. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary,
the idea that the workplace is a "private place," is "private prop-
erty," endures as a powerful cultural underpinning of the sov-
ereignty of capital.
D. Is a Labor Union a "Public" or "Private" Entity? 4
9
This question has many doctrinal formulations, such as whether
various actions of labor unions constitute "governmental action"
for constitutional purposes.50 Another formulation will serve as
the focus of this section: whether a union has the traditional pre-
rogative of a private voluntary association to determine eligibility
to its own membership.
Mitchell v. International Association of Machinists is a leading
although dated case illustrating the problem. In Mitchell, a Cali-
fornia court held unlawful a union's expulsion of a member for
publicly advocating a right-to-work initiative, even though it found
that the union reasonably deemed the initiative a "serious threat"
to its welfare and existence.51 The court reasoned that labor unions
are not purely private, voluntary associations as contrasted with
such organizations as the Republican and Democratic parties.
47See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (no duty "to bargain collectively regarding ... managerial
decisions . . .which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control").
48 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But see City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982) (city invokes power of
eminent domain to prevent departure of major enterprise; court reverses summary
judgment for defendant and remands for determination whether condemnation is
for valid public use).
4 9 Aspects of this problem are explored in Kare, supra note 3, at 470-73.
50oCompare, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2350 n.16
(1982) (Marshall, J.) (rejecting claim that union's adoption of ban on nonmember
contributions in union elections constitutes governmental action) with Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-203 (1944) (duties imposed on unions by
virtue of their quasi-governmental status vis-a-vis represented employees). Thur-
good Marshall appeared in Steele as counsel for the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. His amicus curiae brief forcefully advanced the
view that collective bargaining institutions have a governmental character as to
which constitutional norms ought to be applied. See Motion and Brief for Amicus
Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored People at 27-31, Steele.
51 Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 806, 16
Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (1961).
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Rather, by virtue of their power, function, and legal authority they
are quasi-public entities. Accordingly, unions are subject to a
higher degree of public regulation than would be tolerable vis-a-vis
an ordinary private organization. On this basis, the court found
that the public has an interest in compelling unions to allow dis-
senters to carry on debate within the union regarding controversial
matters of public concern.5 2  The referendum on compulsory
unionism was found to be such a topic, and the expelled member
was held entitled by law to reinstatement to membership.3 Mitchell
thus lends support to the proposition that the union hall is a
public forum.
What about the question of race discrimination in union
membership policies? Prior to title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,54 the law in most jurisdictions tolerated union race discrimina-
tion on the theory that unions are private, voluntary associations
free to establish their own rules for membership eligibility,5 5 a
theory endorsed by the United States Supreme Court.56 Surely,
52 See id. at 801 n.3, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 816 n.3. It is important to note that the
issue in a political expulsion case is not whether the member has a general right to
advocate his or her views on controversial subjects. The first amendment already
protects such advocacy, and NLRA §8(a)(3), (b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3),
(b) (2) (1976), protect job rights from employer and/or union retaliation against em-
ployees because they are out of favor with the union. See NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (union membership and allegiance are "whittled
down to [their] financial core" as far as authorized union security devices are
concerned). The issue in political expulsion cases is whether the employee has a
right to advocate minority views and at the same time to insist upon being a union
member: to work against the union's collectively defined interests and yet to be
accepted by it. Perhaps the answer to these questions should be the same, but
they are different questions, and pose different problems.
53 The history of the legal treatment of expulsion of communists from union
membership provides an ironic twist on this point. Initially, exclusion of com-
munists from unions was justified on the ground that unions, by virtue of their
governmentally derived powers (i.e., by virtue of their semipublic status), had
corresponding responsibilities to protect the public from the imagined threat of
communist subversion. The leading case is American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). In more recent times, the premise that unions are
semipublic entities answerable to public law norms is a basis for the conclusion
that communists may not be excluded from unions. See, e.g., Turner v. Air Transp.
Lodge 1894, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 590 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 919 (1979).
5442 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
55 The leading case was Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 262
F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959). Note, however, that
NLRA §8(a)(3), (b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1976), and the
common law of some states, including California, e.g., James v. Marinship Corp.,
25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944), condemned race discrimination in union
membership when unions sought to enforce union security agreements. See infra
text accompanying note 70.
56 Steele, 323 U.S. at 204 (1944) (collective bargaining laws do not deny
a bargaining representative "the right to determine eligibility to its membership").
[Vol. 130:1358
however, the California court that decided Mitchell spoke of the
public interest in ensuring diversity in union membership in terms
so sweeping as to mandate an end to racial exclusion? Regrettably
not. The Mitchell court distinguished the question of racial ex-
clusion as one that does not pose a problem as to which the public's
interest is strong enough to outweigh the union's traditional pre-
rogatives as a private organization.5z Although unions were more
"public" than the Democratic party-which had long before been
compelled to drop the race bar 0S8-labor unions were apparently still
not "public" enough for this court to declare their Jim Crow
practices illegal.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act has of course made clear that labor
unions are forbidden to engage in race or other invidious discrimi-
nation.P9 In other areas, however, enormous confusion remains as
to the legal status of labor unions. For the most part unions are
still treated as private voluntary associations. Yet the law imposes a
degree of supervision over internal union affairs that appears quite
incompatible with "private" status.6 These statutory controls are
justified on the ground that the public has a vital interest in en-
couraging responsible leadership and democratic governance in
unions.61 Curiously, however, the courts will decide in particular
Steele is discussed at length in Kare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the
Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61
OR. L. REv. 157, 185-98 (1982).
57 196 Cal. App. 2d at 807, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 820.58 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927) (the White Primary Cases). See generally L. TRMBE, supra note 31, at
787-90.
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976) (making unlawful union exclusion, expulsion,
or other discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin).
0o0The primary vehicles of legal supervision of internal union affairs are:
(a) the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act
of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)
and other scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (LMRDA);
(b) the cause of action for the breach of the duty of fair representation implied
from § 2, Fourth of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1976), see
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and from NLRA § 9(a),
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), see Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 336-38
(1953); and
(c) to a somewhat lesser extent, NLRA §8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §158
(b)(1)(A) (1976).
The vast subject of legal regulation of internal union affairs is obviously beyond
the scope of this Article, but it is fair to say that such regulation is sweeping and
raises serious questions as to the meaningfulness of designating unions "private"
associations. It is doubtful that such regulation of internal operating procedures
would be tolerated if applied to business corporations.
G1 See LMRDA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) (congressional finding that public
interest in protecting employees and the free flow of commerce requires federal
supervision of the behavior and governance of labor unions).
1982.] LABOR LAW 1373
1374 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 130:1358
contexts to narrow the scope of their supervisory authority over
unions. Yet rather than articulate a political rationale for such
abstention, the courts characteristically revert to the general notion
that intervention is illicit because labor unions are private entities,
whose duly constituted "management" is entitled to judicial defer-
ence.62 With some regularity, for example, the public/private dis-
tinction has been invoked as a barrier to those who seek to foster
union democracy by means of litigation.6 3
62 For example, in the 1960's judicial intervention to protect the "due process"
Tights of union members guaranteed by LMRDA § 101(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 411
(a) (5) (1976), was fairly substantial. See, e.g., Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d
1157 (3d Cir. 1969); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Vars v. International Bhd. of Boiler-
makers, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963). This trend was then inhibited by the
Supreme Court's decision in International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401
U.S. 233 (1971). The Court established a deferential standard of judicial review
of union disciplinary proceedings, id. 246, in large part based on the view that
unions ought to be left "to govern their own affairs." Id. Justice Douglas" dissent
took the opposite tack. He urged a highly interventionist posture, under which
union disciplinary proceedings would be held to constitutional standards. Id.
252-53. In support of this view, he assumed that unions are not private organi-
zations but are in essence empowered by and responsible to the public. Id. 251-52
("it is unthinkable to me that Congress . . . gave unions the authority to expel
members for such reasons as they chose"). See also Newman v. Local 1011, Com-
munications Workers, 570 F.2d 439, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1978) (regarding removal of
militant shop steward, in absence of very substantial showing of purpose to sup-
press dissent, courts will defer to actions of union officers out of adherence to "long-
standing policy against intervention in the internal affairs of unions").
63 Thus, for example, Ed James argues that administrative and judicial inter-
pretation of the union election provisions of title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 481-483 (1976), have rendered the Act ineffective in fulfilling its promise to
guarantee internal union democracy with respect to insurgent electoral challenges
and turnover of incumbent leadership. James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA:
Autocracy and Insurgency in National Union Elections, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Ev.
247, 248-50, 266, 270-325 (1978). One of the reasons behind this failure is the
tendency of courts to invoke the "privateness" of unions to justify a noninter-
ventionist posture, despite the highly intrusive character of the statutory scheme
and premises:
Why, then have title IV courts been reluctant to fashion more effective
relief? Some of the reluctance may stem from the feeling that unions are
voluntary associations and that their internal affairs should be their own
business. However, in enacting the LMRDA, Congress opted for the
enforcement of union democracy over claims of union autonomy.
Id. 323 (citations omitted). Cf. id. 308 ("Judicial supervision [of the union elec-
tion process] has been characterized by the twin themes of deference to the [Labor]
Secretary's expertise and a policy against intrusion into the internal affairs of
unions.").
There may well be good arguments against the effort to enforce principles of
union democracy through judicial intervention, and good arguments in favor of union
autonomy and notions of informal justice. Friends of the labor movement earnestly
debate the proper role of law in enhancing union democracy. The point here is
that such arguments ought to be explicitly articulated and overtly grounded in a
political vision of the labor movement. Stereotyped arguments resting on manipula-
tion of the public/private distinction are no substitute for much needed political
analysis of these questions.
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An important recent case, Wade v. Teamsters, Local 247,6 il-
lustrates the "flip-flop" character of judicial oscillation on the ques-
tion of union status. Wade holds that a local union's failure to
conduct regular monthly membership meetings violates union mem-
bers' participation rights embodied in title I of the LMRDA. The
court ordered the union to hold such meetings pursuant to judi-
cially established guidelines.6 5 This holding and remedial provi-
sion are extraordinarily interventionist. Yet the very same court
declined to rule that the union's refusal to convene a meeting to
consider certain bylaw amendments proposed by the rank-and-file
is actionable as a breach of the "contract" between the union and
its members. The reasoning offered to support this result was that
Congress intended that "judicial intrusions into internal union
affairs should be limited." 66 The central contradiction in the
court's approach-indeed, in this entire area of the law-is dramati-
cally illustrated by a passage in the discussion of remedies wherein
the court, in effect, orders the union to hold meetings of the type
normally held by voluntary associations.
6 7
E. Do Labor Unions Perform a "Public" or
"Private" Function?
Significant consequences follow from the answer to this ques-
tion in a variety of legal contexts.68  The question may appear
simplistic insofar as unions perform both public and private func-
tions. Nonetheless, the cases often require judges to focus on union
activities that have both public and private dimensions and to
determine which aspect is legally significant for a particular pur-
pose. For example, bargaining over wages advances both the pri-
vate economic interests of the members and, perhaps indirectly, the
public interest in maintaining industrial peace and the uninter-
rupted flow of commerce. In the adjudication of some cases judges
must be able to say which interest is legally significant-that, for
example, wage-bargaining is a public function for purposes of the
64527 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
65 See id. 1174-75,1178-79.
66 Id. 1180.
67 Id. 1178 ("[t]he defendants are ordered and directed to conduct regular
general membership meetings [pursuant to specified guidelines]. The meetings
are to have set agendas, shall be attended and conducted by the elected local
officers, be governed by Roberts Rules of Order where the Bylaws do not govern,
and make reasonable allowance for free discussion of matters affecting union
policy .. . and other subjects normally a part of membership meetings of voluntary
associations").
68 See infra note 74.
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matter at hand, even though everyone knows that it is both public
and private in nature, There is, however, no principled or coherent
method by which judges can choose the dominant aspect. Rather,
selecting the characterization "public function" or "private func-
tion" is often a way of rationalizing a political choice in legal terms.
Cases involving the expenditure of compulsory union dues
command attention because they may be explained comfortably in
two different ways, each with precisely the opposite application of
the public/private distinction. Pursuant to statute, which in the
case of the Railway Labor Act preempts state law to the contrary, 3
unions negotiate contracts with employers requiring union dues
payments as a condition of employment ("union security agree-
ments").7 Yet such compelled dues payments impinge upon the
first amendment rights of dissenting employees to be free from
coerced financial support of organizations to which they might be
deeply opposed on political or religious grounds.71
Under the prevailing approach to this problem, the courts' first
step is to conclude that the public has a compelling interest in
maintaining the system of private collective bargaining, so as to
avoid industrial strife and insure free flow in the arteries of com-
merce. It is then concluded that because unions perform a public
function in this scheme, they are entitled to "tax" all those who
benefit from the fruits of collective bargaining.72 Justice Black
once wrote, quite seriously, that Congress could have appointed the
Secretary of Labor to bargain on behalf of workers, and assessed
them a fee for the Secretary's services, but that instead Congress
selected unions for this purpose.7 3  In sum, the warrant for author-
69 Railway Labor Act, § 2, Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1976). The
corresponding provision of the NLRA is § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976),
but under § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976), state union security law takes
precedence over federal law.
7 0 See generally NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
71 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) ("To compel
employees financially to support their collective bargaining representative has an
impact upon their First Amendment interests."); see also International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (to avoid constitutional questions,
Court construes Railway Labor Act to allow compulsory dues collection in private
sector, but not unconsented expenditure of compulsory dues on political causes).7 2 Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 ("such interference [with dissenters' first amend-
ment rights as is created by union security agreements] is constitutionally justified
by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the
system of labor relations established by Congress"). Abood involved a public
sector union, but the same rule applies in the private sector. See Railway Em-
ployees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) ("the requirement for financial
support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its
work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not
violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments").
73 Street, 367 U.S. at 787 (Black, J., dissenting).
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izing unions to encroach on the first amendment rights of dissenting
workers is that unions perform a vitally important public function3 4
This public function analysis is also marshalled to explain
why unions may not spend their compulsory dues money on political
candidates or ideological causes to which the dissenters object.7 5
This prohibition on unconsented political expenditures even ex-
tends to political issues directly related to labor's interests. That
is, the proscription covers precisely those types of political issues
(among others) that are permissible subjects of union leafletting
on the private property of the employer.-, The public interest in
worker education sanctions the trespass, but apparently not the
union's purchase of the leaflet with compelled dues. Lobbying,
74 The "public function" analysis is also used to explain why unions are en-
titled to deploy certain coercive disciplinary sanctions against strikebreaking members,
even though the right to refrain from striking is protected against union coercion
by NLRA §8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(1)(A) (1976). See NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181-84 (1967).
Allis-Chalmers and its progeny, the so-called "fines cases," in turn raise yet
another series of interesting public/private problems regarding the status and func-
tion of unions. See supra text accompanying notes 49-67. Allis-Chalmers suggests
that unions are quasi-public agencies of federal labor policy, and for that reason
entitled to wield certain disciplinary weapons at the expense of the statutory rights
of dissenting employees. 388 U.S. at 181-84. At first glance one would think
this quasi-public-status analysis would commend itself to Justice Douglas, ever
anxious to apply constitutional standards to labor union conduct. See supra note
62; see also Street, 367 U.S. at 775-79 (Douglas, J., concurring) (union mem-
bers should take constitutional rights with them into the group). However, the
underlying moral claim for Justice Douglas is really that of individualism. In
order to undercut the disciplinary powers accorded to unions in Allis-Chalmers,
therefore, he adopts the posture that a union is merely a private, voluntary asso-
ciation, and therefore a member may avoid its discipline simply by resigning. See
NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213, 215-19 (1972).
The public function analysis also shows up in another unexpected place. The
appeal of the concept is shown by the fact that Professor Feller, an ardent pro-
ponent of union autonomy, proposes that the proper standard for judicial review
of union behavior toward individual employees in the grievance process should
be borrowed from the standard for judicial review of agency action. See Feller,
A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CA=_F. L. REv.
663, 811-12 (1973) (proposing as the standard of fair representation in the
grievance process conduct that is not "arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of dis-
cretion"; these words derive from the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e) (2)
(A), 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (1976)). The existing fair representation standard
bars conduct that is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 190 (1967). Professor Feller grounds his proposal on the fact that in
the grievance process a union "perform[s] a discretionary administrative function,"
that is, it takes on the mantle of a semipublic agency.
71 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 232-37. The same rule applies in the private sector.
See Street, 367 U.S. at 750-70 (applying Railway Labor Act). The same prin-
ciples, allowing compulsory dues collections but not unconsented political expendi-
tures, have been applied to the NLRA. See, e.g., Kolinski v. Lubbers, 530 F.
Supp. 728 (D.D.C. 1982); Havas v. Communications Workers, 468 F. Supp. 144
(N.D.N.Y. 1981); Beck v. Communications Workers, 468 F. Supp. 87 (D. Md.
1979).
76 See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
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supporting candidates, and propagandizing are deemed private,
partisan activities, "unrelated" to the public function that justifies
coerced collection of the dues money in the first place. The courts
therefore hold that unions cannot, consistently with the first amend-
ment, spend compelled dues for political purposes over dissenters'
objections.
The standard analysis of the dues cases assumes what is plainly
false-that the "political" and "economic" functions of unions can
be meaningfully and precisely distinguished.7 7 Moreover, the effort
to specify "public" and "private" roles for unions generates a com-
plex set of legal problems for unions and courts.78 The prevailing
rules invite mischievous judicial inquiry into the "lines between
collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may be
compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargain-
ing, for which such compulsion is prohibited." 79 In this instance
the public/private distinction not only fails to resolve legal ques-
tions, it creates them.
In addition to these difficulties, however, there is an entirely
different type of problem with the public function analysis, one
more immediately relevant to this discussion. In the case of private
sector collective bargaining there is an equally plausible explana-
tion of the dues cases, one that is supported by existing labor law
doctrine, but one that reverses the public/private analysis just
described. It might well be argued that the reason the first amend-
ment is not offended by dues expenditures on collective bargaining
77Cf. Street, 367 U.S. at 800 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (the "political ac-
tivity of American trade unions . . . [is] indissolubly relat[ed] to the immediate
economic and social concerns that are the raison d'6tre of unions"); id. 814 ("[tlhe
notion that economic and political concerns are separable is pre-Victorian").
This analysis of the dues cases also assumes that corporations may have
political privileges denied to unions. Business corporations are permitted to spend
money on political advocacy over the objections of dissenting shareholders. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down on first amend-
ment grounds state statute prohibiting corporate expenditures on state referenda
campaigns). Likewise, public utilities may take public positions on controversial
political issues and force ratepayers to subsidize such advocacy. Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). The Consolidated
Edison Court denied that its holding contemplates forced subsidization, 447 U.S.
at 543 n.13. But Justice Blackmun's dissent persuasively demonstrates that the
Court's decision is not susceptible to narrowing on this point, id. 551-55.
78 C f. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
102 S. Ct. 2675 (1982) (holding that politically motivated strikes are labor dis-
putes for Norris-LaGuardia Act purposes); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
Allied Int'l, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1656, 1664 (1982) ("[t]he distinction between labor
and political objectives [is] difficult to draw in many cases").
79 Abood, 431 U.S. at 236. See, e.g., Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 91
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (union recreational and social activities
held to be outside the sphere of collective bargaining activity).
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-activities is- that such activity is a private function naturally occur-
ring in the private market without substantial governmental over-
sight.80 Because public law merely tolerates union security agree-
ments in the private sector but does not command them, under this
view union security- agreements do not trigger the full range of
constitutional constraints."' From this vantage, private sector col-
lective bargaining resembles the provision of electricity for a fee by
a public utility, the sort of activity the Supreme Court now deems
a private function.82 By contrast, this alternative approach to the
dues cases would view lobbying, electoral activity, and propagandiz-
ing as by definition public activities because they impinge on the
world of politics. Accordingly, governmental responsibility for
compulsory dues payments is higher in this context, and constitu-
tional norms govern. 3
SOSee, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (the NLRA
is fundamentally premised on a system of "private bargaining under governmental
supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual
terms of the contract"). See generally Klare, supra note 3, at 458-68.
81 This perspective informs the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Abood,
431 U.S. at 250-54. Powel's social vision is grounded upon a distinction between
governmentally "authorized" conduct, like contracting, which does not ordinarily
answer to the full range of constitutional constraints, and governmentally "com-
pelled" conduct, which does. This "Reaganite" version of the public/private dis-
tinction corresponds roughly to the premodern division between the world of business,
where the rule of law structures behavior "permissively," and the world of politics,
where law operates "mandatorily." This perspective is central to the anomaly in
Justice Relmquist's thinking highlighted by Professor Brest, see Breit, State Action
and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1296 (1982), namely, that Rehnquist is capable of believing that "state action"
is absent when a warehouseman forecloses on a statutory lien. See Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). To the modem legal mind this notion is absurd, but
perhaps sense can be made of it by seeing it as a reflection of a dichotomy between
"business" (what warehousemen do) and "politics" (what state officers do).
82 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
83 A parallel rationale was used to justify the sudden reversal by the National
Labor Relations Board on the highly significant question whether governmental
action is involved when the NLRB grants exclusive representative certification to a
union guilty of race or sex discrimination. Leaving aside the very real danger
that anti-union employers might use bogus precertification charges of discrimina-
tion simply to delay collective bargaining, presumably all would agree that Board
certification constitutes a public act and therefore must conform to the require-
ments of the equal protection component of the fifth amendments due process
clause. The NLRB so ruled in Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138
(1974). Shortly thereafter Bekins was overruled in Handy Andy, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 447 (1977). Needless to say, NLRB certification procedures did not
ndergo a "privatizing transformation" in the intervening years. The Handy Andy
opinion, however, was strongly influenced by the Burger Court's notion that routine
regulatory action that structures business conduct does not constitute "governmental
action." See 228' N.L.R.B. at 449-52; see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,
419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Powelrs
opinion in the Abood dues case, Rehnquist's opinions in Flagg Bros., Jackson, and
Moose Lodge, and the NLRB's decision in Handy Andy, consistently advance the
view that action by government is not "governmental action" for constitutional
S19821
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In sum, accepting the dubious proposition that the dues cases
make sense, they can be explained in either of two ways: on the
grounds that collective bargaining is a public function, whereas
political advocacy is a private matter; or, at least with respect to
private sector collective bargaining, on the grounds that collective
bargaining is a private function, whereas compelled financial sup-
port of political advocacy involves a coerced ideological association
in the public domain, repugnant to constitutional norms.
F. Are Employment Rights "Public" or "Private" Rights?
Significant consequences can flow from the determination that
a particular workplace right is a "public" or "private" right. The
chief implication of the public/private distinction in this context
is that employees (and other "private" litigants) lose a significant
measure of control over the enforcement of rights if "their" rights
are denominated public rather than private. This loss of litigation
control may result in a serious dilution of the underlying substan-
tive rights.
Rights under the NLRA have traditionally been considered
"public rights." 84 For example, according to this view, the NLRA's
prohibition of retaliatory discharges 0 protects a right of the public
to industrial peace and free-flowing commerce and not a right of
the worker to keep his or her job. Just semantics? Not quite.
Because rights under the NLRA are public rights, a charging party
has no guarantee that the NLRB's General Counsel will proceed
on his or her charge and ordinarily no possibility of judicial review
should the General Counsel decline to proceed.86 The General
law purposes if the government's action consists "merely" in structuring the environ-
ment for business behavior or performing routine tasks that underwrite private
ordering in the business (i.e., "private") world. For a discussion of Justice Stew-
art's contribution to the "Reaganite" theory of "state action," see infra note 166.
84 See Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S.
261 (1940). The doctrine appeared recently in General Am. Transp. Corp., 228
N.L.R.B. 808 (1977) (Chairman Murphy, concurring). The origins of the "public
right" doctrine are traced in Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act
and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MhNN. L. RE,. 265,
310-18 (1978).
8529 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
8629 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976). See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S.
Ct. 1148, 1155 n.6 (1982) (unfair labor practice enforcement "is controlled by the
NLRB's General Counsel, and the Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint is gen-
erally not reviewable either by the Board or by the courts"); NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138-39 (1975) ("Congress has delegated to the
Office of General Counsel 'on behalf of the Board' the unreviewable authority to
determine whether a complaint [of an unfair labor practice] shall be filed. The
practical effect of this administrative scheme is that a party believing himself the
victim of an unfair labor practice can obtain neither adjudication nor remedy under
Counsel can settle an unfair labor practice case without.the charg-
ing party's consent, 7 and a successful charging party lacks standing
to enforce Board remedies through the ordinary contempt pro-
cedures of the court of appeals. 8 Parties aggrieved by NLRB
representation proceedings are ordinarily barred from seeking direct
judicial review of Board decisions.8 9 A parallel to the courts'
"public right" doctrine regarding Board law is the prevailing "ad-
ministrative vision" with respect to the enforcement of the union
election provisions of title IV of the LMRDA.90 This approach,
derived from Supreme Court and other case law, requires the
Secretary of Labor in administering title IV to represent the "public
interest," which includes but does not necessarily coincide with the
complaining union member's interest.91
Some employment rights are deemed private rights. An im-
portant example is the right to equal employment opportunity
under title VII,92 said to be securely vested in the individual.
93
The Court has indicated that title VII rights are private by ruling,
for example, that such rights cannot be waived in the collective
bargaining process.9 Another example is provided by the em-
the labor statute without first persuading the Office of General Counsel that his
claim is sufficiently meritorious to warrant Board consideration." (citation omitted)).
87Although the General Counsel's power of unilateral settlement (settlement
against the wishes of the charging party) has been upheld, it may not be un-
limited. See generally authorities cited in Thm DEvELoPiNG LABoR LAiv 834 (C.
Morris ed. 1971) and THE DEvELoPN G LABOR LAW: CumuLATVE Sui mAE rmr
1971-75 448 (Bioff, Cohen & Hanslowe eds. 1976).
88AAmalgamated Utility Workers, 309 U.S. at 265-66.
89 See American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308' U.S. 401 (1940).
9029 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1976). See James, supra note 63, at 299-300 ("In
the prevailing administrative vision, the Secretary [of Labor]'s role is to balance all
the potentially competing interests in LMRDA enforcement. The Secretary is sup-
posed to represent the 'public interest,' of which the complainant's interest is but a
component. The public interest includes not only the specific aim of promoting
union democracy by enforcing the principles of title IV, but also the interest in the
union's freedom to run its affairs without interference, as well as a multiplicity of
societal interests, such as economic stability, labor peace, industrial democracy,
avoiding corruption in unions, and so on" (footnote omitted)). James credits- the"administrative vision" or "public right" perspective with a significant role in im-
peding title IV enforcement and thereby weakening the forces of union democracy.
Id. 293-313.
91 James, supra note 63, at 300. See also Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389
U.S. 463, 475 (1968) ("Congress emphatically asserted a vital public interest in
assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends the narrow interest of
the complaining union member.").
9242 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
93 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) ("Title
VII . . . stands on plainly different ground [than collectiv6 bargaining rights]; it
concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities.").
94Id. 52.
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ployee's right to fair representation. 95 While a union's breach of
the duty of fair representation is -considered an unfair labor prac-
tice,9 6 the Supreme Court has held that the exclusive primary juris-
diction of the NLRB does nbt preempt federal or state courts from
hearing an individual's private cause of action for breach of the
duty of fair representation. 97 This important decision is grounded in
part upon the fact that under the public right doctrine the-NLRB
might decline to proceed in some fair representation cases.98 The
Court deemed this result unacceptable: "The existence of even a
small- group of cases in which the Board would be unwilling or
unable to remedy a union's breach of duty would frustrate the
basic purposes underlying- the duty of fair representation doctrine." "
The problem with this argument is that it proves too much.
The Court could plainly say the same about the Board's failure to
remedy any class of cases. To put it another way, the purpose of
the public right doctrine is to inhibit the enforcement of statutory
guarantees, or at least to inhibit their enforcement through party-
initiated litigation. Whatever is lost thereby is thought to be out-
weighed by the advantages (some would say the intended disad-
Vartages) of a centralized enforcement system based on prosecutorial
discretion. The real issue is what sort of enforcement mechanism
is desirable regarding a particular set of rights. Labelling rights
either "public" or "individual-private" adds little to analysis of
that problem.
Moreover, it is not at all clear why or even whether some work-
place rights are public or private. Legislative history is typically
useless on the subject. For example, notwithstanding an elaborate
Supreme Court discussion to the contrary, 0° Congress probably did
not intend or expect unions to assume any duty of fair representa-
tion to minority or female employees at all.""
95 See supra note 60.
96 See Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964),
enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). But
see Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963). The prohibition of unfair labor practices protects public
rights, see supra note 84, yet this particular unfair labor practice infringes a private
right, see infra text accompanying notes 97-99.
97 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176-88 (1967).
98 Id. 182-83.
99 Id.; cf. id. 182 n.8 ("[tlhe public interest in effectuating the policies of the
federal labor laws, not the wrong done the individual employee, is always the
Board's principal concern in fashioning unfair labor practice remedies").
100 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199-204 (1944) (duty of fair
representation implied from Railway Labor Act on basis of analysis of congressional
intent).
101 H. HILL, BLACK LAnOn AND THE AMEmcAN LEOAL SYsTEM 93-106 (1977)
(Congress rejected efforts to proscribe union race discrimination in Wagner Act).
1. Clayton v. United Auto Workers
Determining the status of a particular right raises complica-
tions, as illustrated by Clayton v. United Auto Workers.0 2 An
employee brought suit against his employer for allegedly discharg-
ing him without just cause in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, and against his union for alleged unfair representation
in deciding not to process his grievance over the discharge to bind-
ing arbitration. This type of suit is known as a "301-DFR action,"
although it is frequently and inaccurately described as a "301
action." 1o1 Both defendants argued that the employee's failure to
appeal the union's decision through available internal union appeals
procedures barred subsequent action against them. The Supreme
Court ruled that "where an internal union appeals procedure can-
not result in reactivation of the employee's grievance or an award
of the complete relief sought in his § 301 suit, exhaustion will not
be required with respect to either the suit against the employer or
the suit against the union." 104
Clayton contains at least two formulations of the public/private
distinction: first, whether the employee's hybrid claim against the
union and the employer touches matters in the public domain or
questions solely of internal union affairs; and second, whether the
preferred remedies in such cases are "judicial" or "private."
a. Whether the Dispute is "Public" or "Private"
The first question arises in Clayton becausethe two defendants
invoked the federal labor policy of "forestalling judicial inter-
ference with internal union affairs." "35 The Court ruled that this
policy does not extend to issues "in the public domain and beyond
the internal affairs of the union." i'6 The Court distinguished be-
tween "internal" union matters "such as those involving the inter-
pretation and application of a union constitution," 17 and matters
in the "public" domain, such as disputes involving unfair labor
practice charges by a member against his or her union. 8 Because
102451 U.S. 679 (1981).
103 The numerical reference derives from the source of law governing suits on
the collective bargaining contract, §301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
104 Clayton, 451 U.S. at 685.
10' Id. 687.
106Id. 688 (citation omitted) (quoting NLBB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S.
418, 426 n.8 (1968)).
107Id.
108 Id. 688 & n. 14.
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Clayton involved an alleged breach of the statutory duty of fair
r.epresentation, the Court determined that it raised issues of public
policy "extending far beyond internal union interests." 109
This version of the public/private distinction may be reformu-
lated as a distinction between disputes involving public policy and
rights and private disputes. Such a distinction is untenable, not
because some disputes are on the "borderline," but because all
intraunion and interunion disputes are in both domains. The very
fact that a case is in court subject to federal law, thereby giving rise
to a legal question whether the court should defer or withhold its
process, means that a wrong offensive to the concerns of public
policy has been alleged. The Supreme Court has specifically held
that a suit by a local union against a parent international union
alleging a violation of the international's constitution may be main-
tained in federal court." The Court found that such cases suffi-
ciently implicate the national policy of labor stability as to warrant
the extension of federal jurisdiction over them."'
True, there may be some disputes that turn entirely on ques-
tions of "private law"-for example, a suit between local labor
unions over leased premises or over the purchase and sale of office
equipment. The Court left open whether such suits may be main-
tained in federal court." 2 But to claim that these are "purely
private" disputes simply amounts to a conclusion of public policy,
namely that the federal interest in labor stability does not require
public regulation or federal judicial oversight of this particular
class of cases. That the courts are open at all for resolution of such
disputes indicates at least a minimal level of public concern." 3 In
any event, almost all litigation between members and unions and
most litigation between unions touches substantial public interests
109 Id. 688.
11o See United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe-
fitting Indus. v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615 (1981) (treating disputes over union
constitutions as disputes over "contracts between labor organizations" within the
meaning of § 301(a) of the LMRA).
111 Id. 624 ("Surely Congress could conclude that the enforcement of the terms
of union constitutions ... would contribute to the achievement of labor stability.").
112 Id. 627.
113 See generally Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HAmv. L. REV. 553 (1933).
A contract . . . cannot be said to be generally devoid of all public interest.
If it be of no interest, why enforce it? For note that in enforcing con-
tracts, the government does not merely allow two individuals to do what
they have found pleasant in their eyes. Enforcement, in fact, puts the
machinery of the law in the service of one party against the other. When
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in union democracy and responsible union behavior. The very
existence of internal union appeals procedures reflects, if it, does not
always derive from, the public interest in preventing autocracy and
promoting autonomy and democracy within unions.
b. Whether the Remedy Should Be "Public" or "Private"
The second public/private issue arises in Clayton because of
the well-established aspect of "national labor policy that encourages
private rather than judicial resolution of disputes arising over
collective-bargaining agreements." 114 The Court, noted that this
policy might be relevant to Clayton insofar as a rule requiring
aggrieved employees to exhaust internal union remedies in 301-
DFR actions might promote nonjudicial, private resolution of such
disputes.115 The Court, however, declined to impose a universal
exhaustion requirement. It reconciled its holding against the re-
quirement with its continuing preference' for private remedies by
distinguishing the Clayton facts from cases in -which, among other
criteria, the internal union appeals procedures could result in re-
activation of the employee's grievance or an award of the full relief
sought in the 301-DFR action. 116 -The underlying claim in Clayton
was for breach of the collective bargaining contract, raising precisely
the type of issue most clearly appropriate for nonjudicial resolution.
Ironically, the employee succeeded in getting his day in court be-
cause the private dispute-resolution system involved was not struc-
tured so as to guarantee him a private resolution of his grievance.
The Court's contrast between judicial and private resolution
of disputes arising out of collective bargaining agreements may be
reformulated as a distinction between judicial and arbitral processes;
it being assumed that the arbitral process is "private." Classifying
arbitration as a "private" system, however, is problematical to say
the least.117 Some argue that insofar as support for arbitration is so
important a component of national labor policy, it is plausible to
view arbitration as'a public governance system for the workplace.
Accordingly, the argument goes, the difference between the courts
and arbitration is not so much a public/private distinction as one
between agencies of public power: There are, bf course, counter-
arguments of great practical and theoretical significance to this view
of arbitration."18  The point here is only that the Court's simple
114 Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
118 See Kare, supra note 3, at 458-68.
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equation of the court/arbitration -and, public/private distinctions
obscures rather than illuminates important issues demanding more
probing analysis.
2. benShalom v. Secretary of the Army
A final example of the contrast between public and private
rights is benShalom v. Secretary of the Army,119 a landmark case
recognizing a right to sexual preference in public sector employ-
ment. This example is -related to but also somewhat different from
the previous ones. First, -the term "private right" here connotes
not. only that the holder of the right is a private individual but
also that the right owes its existence to a concept of protecting
"privacy" from public intrusion. The "opposite" of such a right-
for example,.a right of the public to a sexually pluralist environ-
ment-is difficult to articulate and has few if any analogues in our
legal discourse.120 Nevertheless, the point of the example is that
the characterization of the right to sexual preference as a "privacy
right" has significant, narrowing consequences for its substantive
definition. Second, because. labor law already treats the previous
examples in terms of an explicit public/private contrast, the focus
of discussion there was on contradictions and incoherence in pre-
vailing doctrine. Here the analysis explores the substantive conse-
quences of basing the right to sexual preference solely on the
notion of "privacy." The purpose of the discussion here is to con-
trast prevailing law with an alternative conception of how rights to
sexual identity and expression might be protected.
benShalom holds unlawful the discharge of a soldier from the
United States Army Reserve on grounds of homosexuality. The
district court determined that the regulation under which the Army
processed benShalom's discharge violates the first amendment rights
of free expression and association. 121  Perhaps more significantly,
the court also found that the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amend-
ments embody a "personal- privacy right" that, if it "means any-
thing.... safely encompass[es] an individual's right to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as one's personality, self-image, and indeed, one's
very identity." 122
119 489 F. Siapp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
120 One example might be provided by the common interpretation under which
the first amendment protects not only dissenting speech by individuals but also a
general interest in having a kind of society that encourages the free, pluralistic
exchange of ideas.




This is a visionary holding, an historic step fQrward in protect-
ing the civil rights of gay people. It ought to be law in every
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the decision to protect freedom in matters
of sexual preference under the rubric of a, personal right to privacy
has problematical consequences. For one thing, by resting on a
traditional John Stuart Mill-conception of the public/private dis-
tinction,123 the court suggests that disciplinary considerations might
justify the Army and possibly other public employers in regulating
the sexual conduct, as opposed to the identity, of their employees.124
How can this distinction between identity and conduct be tenable?
"Self-hood" and "personality" by definition have expressional, com-
municative, and associational dimensions, as the court's first amend-
ment reasoning acknowledges.125 Collective identity nurtures per-
sonal identity; the self without others does not exist.1 6 Moreover,
the court's formulation has a stigmatizing effect, most notably in its
blame-the-victim suggestion that benShalorn holds her constitutional
rights on the condition of sexual abstinence. 27
Ideally, the law should not only create zones of privacy and
protect victimized employees, but it should also recognize a public
right of employees to work in a sexually pluralistic environment.
In this view, the workplace is one of people's most important learn-
ing environments. This approach would therefore require employers
to undertake a public responsibility to facilitate sexual awareness
and choice by combatting sexual prejudice and coercion and by es-
tablishing a workplace atmosphere that allows all people to explore
and express their sexual identities. Employers would be required
not only to take affirmative action to hire gay men and women, but
to provide a work setting conducive to gay pride. While benShalom
enlarges human freedom in important aspects of employment, the
case stops short of full protection of sexual preference because it
rests on a sharp demarcation between public and private dimensions
of working life. At the same time, benShalom contains the insight
that personal identity has an interactive and communicative com-
ponent. The emancipatory potential of the case can only be fully
12
3
J. MiLi, ON LIBERTY ch. 1 (A. Castell ed. 1947).
1
24 benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 976.
125 Id. 974.
126 See generally G. HEEL, TiE P-ENOmENOLOGY OF MND (J. Baille trans.
2d ed. 1967); K. Manx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscript; in EarLy WmT-
INGS, supra note 35, at 279; J. SM uTE, BEING AND NOTHNGNESS (H. Barnes trans.
1956).
127benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 975 (error of the Army's position is that it
assumes homosexual employee will engage in homosexual activity, whereas she
might forego sexual activity).
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realized when its logic is extended to the communal aspects of
working life.
II. THE SHIFTING CONTOURS OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE IMAGERY
IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTEXT
Few categories are as central to the organization of collective
bargaining theory as the public/private distinction. The cases are
replete with ringing affirmations of the centrality of the public/
private distinction as a basic principle of analysis. One of the most
salient of such reminders is Justice Black's opinion for the Court
in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB: 18
One of [the] fundamental policies [of the NLRA] is free-
dom of contract. While the parties' freedom . .. is not
absolute under the Act, allowing the Board to compel
agreement when the parties, themselves are unable to agree
would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act
is based-private bargaining under governmental super-
vision of the procedure alone, without any official com-
pulsion over the actual terms of the contract.129
Scholars and commentators are similarly at pains to recite the im-
portance of the public/private distinction. A leading text confi-
dently intones: "The basic theory of the [NLRA] in its original
form, as today, was that the arrangement of substantive terms and
conditions of employment Was a private responsibility from which
the government should stand apart." 130
Despite all this, it is apparent from the evolution of collective
bargaining law that the public/private distinction has no general
128397 U.S. 99 "(1970) (NLRB may not order employer to accede to a
particular contract clause as remedy for egregious refusal to bargain in good faith).
129Id. 108 (footnotes omitted); cf. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395, 402 n.26 (1952) (citing Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1,
6 (1943)):
The Railway Labor Act, like the National Labor Relations Act, does not
undertake governmental regulation of wages, hours, or working conditions.
Instead it seeks to provide a means by which agreement may be reached
with respect to them. The national interest expressed by those Acts is not
primarily in the working conditions as such. So far as the Act itself is
concerned these conditions may be as bad as the employees will tolerate
or be made as good as they can bargain for.
130 A. Cox, D. Box & R. GoPMAN, CAsEs AND MATnmALs ON LABoR LAW 84
(8th ed. 1977); cf. id. 93 ("the Taft-Hartley (amendments of 1947] abandoned
the notion that law has no role to play in the handling of labor disputes ....
Nevertheless, the points at which the Taft-Hartley Act revives legal intervention
into everyday disputes are trivial in comparison to those it leaves untouched");
id." 760 ("national labor policy [relies] primarily on private adjustments of con-
flicting interests . . .instead of on determination by law").
significance; it takes on meaning only in a particular historical and
political context.
The modern history of the labor injunction provides a pre-
eminent example of this point. During the 1930s public/private
imagery was deployed to justify judicial withdrawal from the labor
relations field,131 as seen most notably in the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia
anti-injunction act.1 32  By the 1970s, however, public/private
rhetoric in labor relations law was recast so as to justify judicial
intervention. A significant instance is the doctrine of Boys Markets
v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770,133 which allows courts to grant
injunctive relief against strikes over arbitrable grievances, notwith-
standing Norris-LaGuardia. The contemporary view is that there
is a significant public interest in avoiding midcontract work-stop-
pages over employee grievances. In the words of the Boys Markets
Court: "congressional emphasis [has] shifted from protection of the
nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargain-
ing and to administrative techniques [principally grievance and
arbitration procedures] for the peaceful resolution of industrial
disputes." 134 By the time of Boys Markets, judicially enforced
adherence to grievance-arbitration agreements had become a "domi-
nant motif" and a "kingpin of federal labor policy." I'
It might appear that during both the 1930s and the 1970s a
consensus existed on the need for demarcation between public and
private, and that nothing had changed but the categorization of
certain subjects. In this view, all that occurred in the case of
grievance strikes was a gradual reconsideration of the particular
issue, leading to a conclusion that on balance it should be trans-
ferred from the domain of private ordering to the realm of public
responsibility. In fact, a great deal more was involved. The very
idea of "private enterprise" had to be transformed so as to make it
comfortable to believe what earlier was almost inconceivable: that
private enterprise and managerial prerogative are consistent with a
legal regime that makes employer responses to employee grievances
a matter of public policy.
131 See infra text accompanying notes 137-53.
13229 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); see id. § 101 ("[n]o court of the United
States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except
in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter").
13.3 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See generally infra notes 238-43 and accompanying
text.
134 Boys Mkts., 398 U.S. at 251.
135 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 225-26 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In Boys Markets the Court, per Justice Brennan, overruled Sinclair
and explicitly adopted the position of the Sinclair dissent.
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Part II will describe the gradual redefinition between 1935
and 1970 of the boundaries between the public and private spheres,
as seen from the vantage of the theory of private sector collective
bargaining law. The premise of the exercise is that we will better
appreciate the ideological messages encoded in the legal rules if we
trace the chameleon-like alterations in public/private imagery rather
than treating the public/private distinction as in itself conceptually
meaningful.
A. Prewar Public/Private Imagery
It is remarkable that at a time when the viability of the public/
private distinction was under attack in most political and legal con-
texts, the philosophy of labor law reform embodied such resolute
faith in the distinction. A central theme of the politics of the
1930s was the challenge to the supposed independence of business
and politics. Similarly, one of the most important developments
in legal thought was the Legal Realists' criticisms of the traditional
conception of "private ordering." The gist of these criticisms was
that so-called private ordering in fact amounts to a system of social
control implicating issues of public policy. 36 The movement to,
enact the NLRA was informed by these political and intellectual
currents.
Nonetheless, the NLRA was grounded upon and justified by
reference to a rudimentary version of public/private rhetoric. The
basic philosophy of the Wagner Act was that labor problems would
be resolved by a private process of negotiation and contracting,
backed up by the threat or use of self-help measures to secure
bargaining advantage. 37 The specifics of the statutory scheme were
fashioned in keeping with this vision.
True enough, the law contains some provisions of an inter-
ventionist mold, provisions that curtail private managerial pre-
rogative. Notable examples are the employer's obligations to re-
136 See supra note 113.- See generally Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37); Hale, Bargain-
ing, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 603 (1943); Hale, Force
and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 CoLm.
L. REv. 149 (1935); Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 H-Av. L. REv.
201 (1937); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 CoLUm. L. REv. 629 (1943); Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection
of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil
Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARiv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297, 339-60
(1977).
137 See Cox, supra note 16, at 322 ("[tlhe Wagner Act became law on the
floodtide of the belief that the conflicting interests of management and worker can
be adjusted only by private negotiation, backed, if necessary, by economic weapons,
without the intervention of law").
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frain from interference with employee self-organization and to
recognize and bargain with majority unions.138 The need for these
interventionist provisions stemmed from a corollary of the Act's
basic philosophy, namely the premise that there is a public iiterest
in promoting unionization as a form of private power. It was
believed that for the private ordering system to function effectively
and thereby to foster industrial peace, there had to be some "clout"
on the employees' side. This was to be achieved by allowing and
encouraging workers to pool their bargaining power. 139 Clearly,
though, the mission of public law was narrowly limited to the task
of establishing and maintaining an effective private bargaining
system.
The two foremost symbols of the private bargaining orienta-
tion--the plan to keep the law "out" of labor-management relations
-were first, the narrow scope of the employer's duty to bargain
collectively favored by many proponents of the Act; and - second,
the withdrawal of federal equity jurisdiction regarding labor dis-
putes.140 The duty to bargain was one of the provisions of the Act
most bitterly opposed by employers, who saw in it a mortal threat
to their sovereignty in the workplace.141 To sell the Act politically,
to defend it against constitutional attack, and to reassure employers
and nudge them toward reconciliation with collective bargaining,
prominent proponents of the statutory scheme were at some pains
to insist that it did not contemplate government supervision of the
substantive terms and conditions of employment.
138 These obligations were imposed by the Wagner Act, the original version
of the NLRA, §8(1), (2), (3), (5), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (2), (3) (proscription of employer interference), (5)
(duty to bargain) (1976)).
139 See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 506-07 (1960)
(separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter) (citation omitted):
The main purpose of the Wagner Act was to put the force of law behind
the promotion of unionism as the legitimate and necessary instrument "to
give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer" . . .
Equality of bargaining power between capital and labor.., was the aim
of this legislation.
140 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). See supra note 132.
141 1 have argued elsewhere at some length that these fears were plausible.
Klare, supra note 84, at 281-93. My views on this point are criticized in Comment,
The Rad'cal Potential of the Wagner Act: The Duty to Bargain Collectively, 129
U. PA. L. REv. 1392 (1981). The comment misunderstands my point. I did not
claim that Congress "intended" a radical interpretation of the Act. My poinf was
that it-was and is impossible to determine precisely what Congress did intend,
that at the time the Act was passed it was susceptible to a radical interpretation,
and that therefore employers plausibly feared that such an interpretation would
evolve. Accordingly, the evidence adduced in the comment simply does .not rebut
my claims. Indeed, the only relevance of such evidence is that much or'it tends
to prove my point that congressional intent was unclear.
1391
1392 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Thus, perhaps the most important instance in American his-
tory of public regulation of the workplace was contemporaneously
defended and justified on the ground that it would not interfere
with private determination of working conditions. Friends of col-
lective bargaining anxious to promote employer reconciliation en-
couraged a narrow interpretation of the duty to bargain, one that
eschews governmental supervision of the content and as much as
possible of the conduct of the employer's bargaining posture.1 42
The battle cry for such advocates was a renowned and oft-quoted
passage from the legislative history. This passage neatly captures
the mid-1930s view of the public/private distinction in its meta-
phor of a doorway, a precise demarcation between the public and
private realms:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when
they have selected their representatives, all the bill pro-
poses to do is to escort them to the door of their employer
and say, "Here they are, the legal representatives of your
employees." What happens behind those doors is not in-
quired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.1 3
Also symbolic of the "privatization" of the new federal labor
policy was the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,144 the primary pur-
pose of which was to bar the federal courts from issuing injunctions
in cases arising out of labor disputes save in the most exceptional
circumstances. 1 45  Although neutral in theory, courts of equity,
particularly federal courts, had systematically intervened in labor
disputes on the employers' side, aggressively so since the late nine-
teenth century. 46 Before Norris-LaGuardia the labor injunction
had been a primary legal weapon in employers' efforts to forestall
the progress of organized labor. Congress's 1932 command that
the federal courts henceforth refrain from wielding that weapon
represented a dramatic shift of public policy toward "deregulation"
of labor conflict. Today one commonly thinks of deregulation as a
pro-business strategy, but, at least in this instance, the intent was
pro-labor. In light of the history of judicial bias in favor of man-
142 See Kare, supra note 84, at 293-310.
14379 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935) (statement of Senator Walsh). See infra note
158.
'4429 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
145See id. § 104 (specific acts, such as peaceful picketing, not enjoinable in
cases involving or growing out of labor disputes); id. § 107 (stringent procedural
and substantive barriers to issuance of any injunction in labor dispute cases).
146 See generally F. Mar Tjm & N. Gnxs, Tnm LABOR .Njrno,1O,
(1930).
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agement, the idea behind Norris-LaGuardia was that labor's strength
and organization would grow and unions would best be enabled to
produce results for employees under a regime of judicial abstention.
To provide philosophical underpinnings for such abstention,
proponents of Norris-LaGuardia fastened on public/private rhetoric..
The Act was widely justified by virtue of its connection to a larger
vision, the view that industrial problems are best left to the private
conflict and accommodation of economic forces: 147
The Norris-LaGuardia [Act] marks the high water mark
of the philosophy that law had no useful role to play in
labor relations. Its thesis was that so long as unions and
employers refrain from fraud, violence and intimidation,
their pursuit of self-interest is to be left to the competitive
struggle with the outcome ultimately depending upon
economic power. 48
Indeed, the principle of remitting industrial disputes to the
private sphere was a crucial selling point of New Deal labor law
reform to organized labor as well as to employers. Labor was sus-
picious of the federal government because of the unhappy experi-
ence of over half a century of government-sponsored strikebreaking,
not only through the labor injunction but also through repressive
legislation such as the antitrust laws, military intervention, federal
court nullification of progressive reforms, and so on.140 In this
respect labor's need for reassurances against undue governmental
involvement in the collective bargaining process closely paralleled
management's fears. Liberal proponents of collective bargaining
therefore sought to allay the qualms of both groups by insisting
1470 One should note, however, that in at least one significant respect the Norris-
LaGuardia Act narrowed rather than enlarged the scope of private ordering. Sec-
tion 3, 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1976), declared void as against public policy the so-called
"yellow dog" contract, in which an employee promises not to join a labor union.
The "illegality" or "voidness as against public policy" doctrine is a classic instance
of social control of the private contracting system.
148 Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Roc
Mrx. L. lEv. 247, 253-54 (1958).
149The philosophy behind the labor legislation of the nineteen thirties
was deeply rooted in the disappointing experience of half a century of
legal intervention into industrial conflicts.. . . Congress turned [to] the
policy of relying for the adjustment of industrial conflicts upon negotiation
between employers and labor organizations strong enough to bargain
effectively on behalf of employees. Judicial intervention into strikes,
boycotts or picketing was prohibited partly because it did nothing to
resolve the underlying problems and partly because the injunction was
traditionally a weapon for weakening employee organization.
Cox, supra note 16, at 323.
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that publicly sponsored collective bargaining would for the most
part be a private system of industrial conflict resolution.
To the contemporary eye, most notably absent from the model
of collective bargaining promoted by 1930's labor law reform is any
suggestion that management responses to day-to-day worker griev-
ances ought to be deemed a concern of public policy, let alone a
"dominant motif" of federal labor policy as it is today.150 Em-
ployers feared that NLRB enforcement of the duty to bargain
might lead to public supervision of contract terms,151 and additional
attention to public control of midcontract labor problems would
only have exacerbated their concerns. To be sure, the notion of
collective bargaining as a continuous rulemaking process was avail-
able in the most advanced labor relations thinking and literature.
However, it does not seem to have influenced deeply the actual
design of and early decisions under the Wagner Act.152 The 1935
statutory scheme provided no governmental machinery for the air-
ing and adjustment of midcontract grievances. For a variety of
reasons, this problem was to become a focal point in the develop-
ment of labor law over the next thirty-five years.
153
B. The Postwar Transformation (I): Expansion of
the Public Role
The most salient characteristic of postwar collective bargaining
law is the redefinition of the role of public intervention in the
collective bargaining process, a change often capsulized in the
notion that the "public sphere" expanded at the expense of the
"private sphere." As will be seen, this summary characterization
correctly highlights the dominant trend of public expansionism.
It is misleading, however, unless qualified by the observation that
the real and symbolic significance of private autonomy in the col-
lective bargaining process, particularly for employers, has also under-
gone a theoretical and doctrinal revival in the postwar years.
154
Rather than viewing the period as one of uniform, glacier-like
governmental encroachment on the private sphere, it is perhaps
15o See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
151 See Kare, supra note 84, at 287-88.
152 See generally Stone, supra note 3, at 1514-22 (early expressions of govern-
mental theory of collective bargaining; absence of contract enforcement machinery
under Wagner Act).
153 See infra notes 207-43 and accompanying text. See generally Kare, supra
note 3; Stone, supra note 3.
154 See infra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
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more helpful to focus on the simultaneous and mutually reinforcing
metamorphoses of both the public and private spheres in labor law.
The private sphere has maintained an unyielding integrity of
its own, and, hence, some equilibrium in the public/private contra-
position. Still, it is ultimately true that the postwar period wit-
nessed a pronounced drift toward public expansionism. In terms
of Senator Walsh's famous metaphor, 5 5 the law has not only crossed
the threshold and passed through the doorway, but it permeates the
atmosphere of the employer's office. 1 6 Three major components
of this trend are the increased legal regulation of collective bar-
gaining negotiations, the expanded judicial role in administering
the collective bargaining contract, and increased statutory regula-
tion of the employment relationship.
1. Legal Intervention in the Bargaining Relationship
Justice Black's dictum notwithstanding, 57 the law today pro-
foundly influences the procedure, subject matter, and even the sub-
stance of collective bargaining. The law dictates, where it is obeyed,
the topics about which management and labor may or must bar-
gain.158 It sets limits on when the use of economic weapons is
permissible. 5 9 It establishes certain rules of bargaining conduct
that the parties must observe in their own behavior 160 or tolerate
in that of their adversary.16'
155 See supra text accompanying note 143.
'
5 6 Cf. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HIav. L. Brv. 1401, 1403
(1958) ("[The law has crossed the threshold into the conference room and now
looks over the negotiator's shoulder. Is the next step to take a seat at the bargain-
ing table?").
157 See supra text accompanying note 129.
158 See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)
(employer or union may insist on negotiations over "mandatory" subjects of bar-
gaining); cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 219 n.2
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("There was a time when one might have taken
the view that the National Labor Relations Act gave the Board and the courts no
power to determine the subjects about which the parties must bargain-a view
expressed by Senator Walsh when he said that public concern ends at the bar-
gaining room door.... But too much law has been built upon a contrary assump-
tion for this view any longer to prevail ....") (citations omitted).
15 Thus, for example, an implication of Borg-Warner and its progeny is that
unions may not strike to enforce their will with respect to so-called "permissive"
subjects of collective bargaining.
160 See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (prohibition of unilateral
changes); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (obligation to provide
information).
161 See, e.g., NLR.B v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960)
(although not protected, concerted on-the-job activities designed to pressure em-
ployer during negotiations are not proscribed by the duty to bargain in good
faith).
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Moreover, decisions under the NLRA and other statutes can
influence or determine the content of collective bargaining con-
tracts, either by designating certain categories of agreement as im-
permissible 162 or by altering the underlying, precontractual alloca-
tion of workplace rights and responsibilities.
Two recent cases illustrate the latter point. In NLRB v.
J. Weingarten, Inc.,163 the Supreme Court enlarged the interpreta-
tion of the "rights of employees" guaranteed by section 7 of the
NLRA 16 to include an employee's right to union representation at
investigatory interviews that the employee reasonably believes may
result in disciplinary action. In NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 65 the
Court held that employee leafletting rights derived from section 7
cannot be waived by a collective bargaining contract. Decisions of
this kind alter the distribution of rights and powers with which
bargaining commences and therefore alter the substantive outcomes
of bargaining. In each case dissenters urged that the Court had
engineered an improper statutory incursion into the area of work-
place law that should properly be left to private ordering. 166 Of
162 See, e.g., Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 435 U.S. 40
(1978) (upholding Federal Maritime Commission scrutiny of collective bargaining
agreements under Shipping Act for anticompetitive restraints); Connell Constr. Co.
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (judicial scrutiny of
collective bargaining activities for antitrust violations); Local 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (same); United Mine Workers
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (same).
163 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
164 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
165 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
166 See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 270 (Powell, J., joined by Stewart, J., dis-
senting) ("An employee's right to have a union representative . . . at an in-
vestigative interview is a matter that Congress left to the free and flexible exchange
of the bargaining process."); Magnavox, 415 U.S. at 330 (Stewart, J., joined by
Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("in nullifying
the union's promise to waive the literature-distribution rights of its own supporters,
the Board and today the Court are upsetting the delicate balance ach'eved in the
give and take of negotiations and presenting the union with an undeserved windfall.").
As these cases indicate, the theme of governmental regulation versus private
ordering is a hallmark of Justice Stewart's labor law opinions. Perhaps the con-
tractualist influence on his thinking induced his defection from the anti-affirmative
action alliance in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(recognizing constitutional restrictions on state-mandated affirmative action plans),
to the pro-affirmative action majority in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979) (upholding collectively bargained affirmative action plan). Justice
Stewart cast an important swing-vote in Weber.
Stewart's unique perspective on the public/private distinction raises serious
questions germane to this symposium. In a remarkable opinion issued just prior
to his resignation from the Court he wrote that "[s]o far as the Constitution goes,
a private person may engage in any racial discrimination he wants, cf. Steelworkers
v. Weber, . . . but under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a sovereign state may never do so." Minnick v. California Dep't of Correc-
tions, 452 U.S. 105, 128 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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course the dissenters overlook the obvious point- that a decision not
to expand the scope of section 7 rights also implicates public law in
the initial assumptions and, hence, in the substantive outcomes of
collective bargaining.
2. The Enlarged Judicial Role In Contract Administration
Another aspect of governmental intrusion into the hitherto
private sphere of labor-management relations involves the prolifera-
tion of federal common law of the collective contract. 167 While
This sentence is astounding for several reasons, even leaving aside the gratuitous
characterization of the affirmative action program in the Weber case as a form of
race discrimination. It is not entirely clear that the Constitution permits private
persons to engage in any species of race discrimination. The thirteenth amend-
ment may directly forbid forms of race discrimination constituting "badges and.
incidents of slavery." See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-25
(1981) (leaving question open and asserting that exercise of congressional power
under the thirteenth amendment is not inconsistent with the view that the amend-
ment has self-executing force). In any event, the thirteenth amendment authorizes
Congress to forbid certain forms of race discrimination by private individuals.
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Stewart, J.) (thirteenth amend-
ment allows Congress to condemn private acts of race discrimination); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Stewart, J.) (same). Moreover, it
is late in the day to view a complex collective bargaining agreement such as was
involved in Weber as the act of a "private person." Cf. Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) (Railway Labor Act imposes upon union in the
collective bargaining process "at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the
interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legisla-
ture to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates").
For purposes of this discussion Justice Stewart's Minnick opinion is most
interesting because it aligns him with what I have called the "Reaganite" version
of the public/private distinction. See supra notes 81 & 83 (Justices Powell and
Rehnquist). By this I mean a view of the world in which there is a sharp divi-
sion between the realm of government ("public") and the realm of business
("private"). Thus, just as the warehousemari's foreclosure on a statutory lien is
"private" for Justice Rehnquist because it is ordinary business behavior, see Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), the negotiation of a major collective bar-
gaining agreement of national significance is "private" for Justice Stewart because
it is routine conduct in the business world. A great irony of Minnick is that it
places Justice Stewart's thinking on private sector collective bargaining-i.e., his
notion that government permits but does not compel the parties to structure their
agreement in any particular way-in precise alignment with Justice Powell's
pointed criticisms of justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 245-50 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
Justice Stewart has made other contributions to the Reaganite public/private
theory. One of the most important and grotesque is Stewart's recent defense of
the view that government bears no responsibility for the unequal social distribu-
tion of income. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (upholding
constitutionality of denial of Medicaid funding for therapeutic abortions, in part on
the ground that government's decision to deny funding does not constitute a gov-
ernmentally created obstacle to poor woman's exercise of freedom of choice).
1 67 See Cox, supra note 148, at 254 ("Since [1947] it has been clear that law
and judicial sanctions are a vital part of the national labor policy not only in the
organizational phase of labor relations but also in the negotiation and administra-
tion of collective agreements.").
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vast areas of the law of the shop remain under the control of the
parties, the postwar period saw a pronounced propensity of courts
to override party-intent in the administration of collective bargain-
ing agreements. 168  Of course, by itself judicial intervention of this
kind is not news. What is unusual about the courts' postwar role,
especially in light of the then still recent experience of the labor
injunction, is the relatively systematic and sophisticated way the
courts used their contract enforcement powers to play a role in
making overall policy regarding the nation's labor relations. This
is seen most notably in the emergence of the federal labor policy
favoring enforced adherence to collectively bargained arbitration
procedures.
In service of this goal, the courts have preferred interpretations
of collective contracts favorable to binding arbitration. Some such
interpretations are plausible and, in any event, relatively easy for
the parties to avoid by renegotiation if they are unintended. 69
More recent instances have involved strained and improbable con-
structions, some flying in the face of the clearest evidence of the
parties' intent. A striking example is the Court's literally in-
credible interpretation of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers.170 Gate-
way Coal announces that in order for employees to reserve the
statutory right to strike under a contract containing a broad arbi-
tration clause, the contract must explicitly negate the implied no-
strike obligation raised by the employer's promise to arbitrate
disputes.' 71 This rule of construction has been applied elsewhere,
with devastating effect upon workers' statutory rights and with at
best dubious fidelity to contractual intent.172 It is difficult in light
168 A dramatic example is the Court's questionable interpretation of the con-
tract in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (implied
promise not to strike). Justice Black's scathing dissent lays bare the Court's
cavalier treatment of party-intent. Id. 108 ("I had supposed .. . though evi-
dently the Court thinks otherwise-that the job of courts enforcing contracts was
to give legal effect to what the contracting parties actually agree to do, not to
what courts think they ought to do.").
169 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960) (strong presumption in favor of arbitrability of grievances).
170414 U.S. 368 (1974) (injunction against mine safety strike). The im-
plausibility of the Court's construction is painstakingly demonstrated in Atleson,
Threats to Health and Safety: Employee Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN.
L. IEv. 647, 664-86 (1975).
171 Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 382.
172 See, e.g., Goya Foods, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1978) (extension of no-
strike obligation beyond the term of contract).
of such cases to maintain the fiction that the. collective contract is
simply an expression of the will of private parties.
173
3. Direct Statutory Regulation of the Employment
Relationship 174
The dramatic expansion of federal and state statutory, programs
regulating the employment relationship is perhaps the most im-
portant category of postwar public law "incursions" into labor-
management affairs. Some of these statutory developments reflect
a political consensus that collective bargaining has not and perhaps
cannot, by itself resolve certain basic social problems of the work-
place:- race, sex, and other forms of invidious discrimination in
employment, 175 the dangers of occupational injury and disease,
17
and problems of retirement income security.177 Others reflect a
political consensus that public scrutiny of internal union decision-
making, finances, and other practices is necessary,178 that is, that
public power should be deployed to curb perceived abuses of pri-
vate group power.1
79
C. The Postwar Transformation (II): The Resurgence
of Privatism
During the same period that witnessed the waves of public ex-
pansionism in collective bargaining law just discussed, the ideal of
173 Cf. Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CAsE
W. REs. L. B-v. 396, 411-13 (1979) (discussing Textile Workers Union v,
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)). Lynd makes the point that in interpreting
the arbitration and no-strike provisions of the contract at bar in Lincoln Mills,
the Court focused entirely on the intent of Congress in enacting section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), not the
intent of the parties to that contract
174 0n the themes of this paragraph, see generally Hyde, Beyond Collective
Bargaining: The Politicization of Labor Relations Under Government Contract,
1982 Wis. L. REv. 1, 38-40 (1982) (growth of federal statutory restrictions on
the terms and conditions of employment); Feller, supra note 25, at 123-25 (chang-
ing status of the autonomous system of collective bargaining centered on arbitra-
tion traced in part to increased statutory regulation of employment relationship).
175See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1976); title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
176 See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
177 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1381 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
178 See supra note 60.
179 Cf. supra text accompanying note 139.
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private autonomy was refurbished and reinvigorated in profoundly
important ways. The explanation for this conjugate development
lies in the ideological functions of the public/private distinction.
It is impossible for contemporary legal discourse to jettison public/
private imagery by overly favoring the public side. The ideal of
private ordering possesses enormously potent ideological valences
in our political culture, both as a source of institutional values and
as a symbolism. It is therefore carefully cultivated even as public
regulation expands.
Four major aspects of the resurgence of privatism in con-
temporary collective bargaining law are the waiver principle, defer-
ence to arbitration, the management prerogatives doctrine, and the
narrowing of employee self-help rights.
1. The Waiver Principle
The "waiver principle" is used here to denote the preeminence
in modern labor-management relations of the contract as a legal
device and collective bargaining as a political process designed to
induce employees to surrender, for a price, their statutory rights to
concerted activity and coparticipation in enterprise governance. 80
The no-strike clause, express or implied, is the mechanism by which
unions trade employees' right to strike during the contract term.' 8'
The management-rights clause is the device by which employees
alienate their statutory right to participate through collective bar-
gaining in determining the terms and conditions of employment.1
s2
The emphasis labor law places upon the collective contract
tends to legitimate it as the preeminent source of law in the organ-
ized workplace 183 and as the ultimate goal of the employees' unioni-
zation struggle. The law tends to diminish the value of other
forms of concerted activity and to proscribe some that do not fit
the contractualist mold, such as wildcat strikessa4 The overall
1s0 This point is developed in Kare, Labor Law and the Liberal Political
Imagination, SOCIAUST REv., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 45, 51-53, 57-61.
181 See generally Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
(implied no-strike obligation); SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PurBsrc WELFARE,
ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACT RESPONSMILITIES, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist
Sess. 15-18 (legislative history of LMRA § 301 emphasizes importance of enforce-
ment of contractual no-strike promises).
182 See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (manage-
ment-rights clause providing for exclusive managerial control of mandatory sub-
jects of collective bargaining during the term of the contract is itself a mandatory
subject as to which management may bargain to impasse).
18 3 But see supra text accompanying notes 174-79 and sources cited in note
174.
184 See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
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thiust is to channel employee aspirations into'conventional eco-
nomic demands.'8 5 Yet focusing on the contract as the primary
repository of employee rights deflects scrutiny from the terms of the
waivers involved. It suggests instead that the reality or appearance
of due process in the bargaining stage endows negotiated working
conditions with the imprimatur of justice, no matter how onerous
or inequitable they may be..
2. Deference to Arbitration
The policy of judicial 86 and administrative 187 deference to
grievance arbitration is a second "privatizing" theme in modern
collective bargaining law. We have already noted that whether
the arbitral forum is itself "private" is a question not entirely free
from complexity.:18  Nonetheless, labor law decisionmaking has
been deeply informed by the theory that grievance arbitration is an
autonomous, private dispute-resolution system that serves the cause
of industrial peace precisely because it is so responsive to the needs
and concerns of the parties.189 Whether or not this is an accurate
and useful view of grievance arbitration, there can be no doubt
that the deference slogan has vested the private institutional parties
to collective bargaining, the employer and the union, with enormous
power and latitude in fashioning industrial common law.190
3. Management Prerogatives
A third way in which private power, in this case the employer's
power, maintains control over the collective bargaining process is
through the principle of management prerogative, particularly as
manifested in the "subjects of bargaining" doctrine. We have
previously focused on this area as a prime instance of governmental
185 See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
186 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960) (judicial deference to arbitration); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (same); United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (same).
'
8 7 See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (NLRB
deference to arbitration); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971)
(same); Speilberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (same).
188 See supra notes 23-30 & 117-18 and accompanying text.
189 See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578-81; ef. Shulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 H~av. L. REv. 999 (1955)
(emphasis in discussing collective bargaining on autonomy of the parties' private
system of industrial self-government).
190 Kare, supra note 3, at 458-68, develops the ideological significance of the
point that the basic "charter" or "statute" of the industrial rule of law, the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, represents the expression of the will of private parties.
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power over the substance of collective bargaining. 191 It is equally
important to emphasize the aspect of the "subjects" doctrine that
safeguards the exercise of private power. The purpose and effect
of denominating some subjects "nonbargainable" is to permit pri-
vate power to supersede public law norms and conceptions of in-
dustrial democracy with respect to such issues. The effort to shelter
capital investment decisions, particularly regarding plant relocation
and closure, from employee participation has manifested a cancerous
growth in American labor law in recent times. This development
has been facilitated by ringing Supreme Court pronouncements that
[the duty to bargain does not extend to] managerial de-
cisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.
Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capi-
tal and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in
themselves primarily about conditions of employment,
though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to
terminate employment . . . . [T]hose management de-
cisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a
corporate enterprise . . . should be excluded from [the]
area [subject to the duty of collective bargaining]. 1
92
So important is the "core of entrepreneurial control" doctrine
that it has totally perverted the interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act. Under the currently prevailing test for deter-
mining whether a particular type of managerial decision is subject
to the duty to bargain, 193 the advocates of mandatory bargaining
over significant industrial decisions must demonstrate that the
public interest in workplace democracy, as expressed through
government-fostered collective bargaining, outweighs the incon-
venience of collective bargaining to private power-holders. But
Congress settled that issue in 1935, in general and largely unquali-
fied terms. The very purpose of the NLRA is to "encumber"
managerial decisionmaking with a collective bargaining process,
precisely because the value of employee participation is deemed to
outweigh the foreseeable inconvenience of collective bargaining to
191 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
192Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
193 [Iln view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaing,
bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on
the continued availability of employment should be required only if the
benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981).
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the employer. The. Court's new standard for "interpreting" the
NLRA therefore really amounts to a subversion of its most basic
premises and serves only to ratify the existing hierarchy of power.' M
4. Loss of Section 7 Rights-
A fourth aspect of the resurgence of privatism is a set of legal
developments depriving employees of rights to self-organization and
concerted activity. In form such* developments represent public
regulation of the collective bargaining arena. In substance they
are definitions of or changes In the groundrules designed to bolster
the primacy of the employer's economic power by penalizing certain
types of employee activity designed to counteract it. The outstand-
ing example is the Taft-Hartley statutory prohibition against
secondary boycotts.195 Others are the proliferating doctrines de-
signed to remove legal protection from certain kinds of employee
concerted activity :9 and those limiting the right to strike.
197
104 For an exceptionally interesting discussion of the management prerogatives
doctrine, see J. ATLEsoN, VAL Es & ASSUMPTIONS n AmucAr LABoR LAW 140-
212 (forthcoming, 1983) (manuscript copy on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review).
195 See NLRA §8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976); LMRA §303, 29
U.S.C. § 187 (1976).
196 It is extraordinary how much of the law of NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976), pertains to ways in which employees may lose rather than gain §7 rights.
See, e.g., supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. Section 7 rights can be lost in
three main ways:
(a) by waiver: see NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975)
(employee may waive right to be accompanied by union representative at investi-
gatory interview); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
(waiver of right to strike by union); NLRB v. American Nat'l Iis. Co., 343 U.S.
395 (1952) (waiver by union of bargaining rights during contract term through
"management functions" clause);
(b) by operation of law: see supra note 16 (disruption and indefensible dis-
loyalty); 'Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50 (1975) (loss of protection for concerted activity that undermines the "majority
rule" principle of federal labor policy); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967) (to preserve united front unions may discipline strikebreakers
despite statutory right of employees to refrain from concerted activity); NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (concerted activity involving
misconduct such as sit-down strike is unprotected); NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (business needs supersede §7 rights, allowing
permanent replacement of economic strikers); cf. Leviton Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 486
F.2d 686 (1st Cir. 1973) (employment-related legal action filed in bad faith not
protected by § 7). Note also that conduct constituting an unfair labor practice is
unprotected, see B. GoBmAN, supra note 37, at 303-05;
(c) by inadequate enforcement: see, e.g., Kowal, The Shocking State of the
Board's Section 8(a)(3) Decisions, 4 INDus. BREL. L.J. 308 (1981) (weaknesses in
NLRB approach to discrimination cases result in significant dilution of employee
rights under NLBA).
197 See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 102 S. Ct.
1656 (1982) ("political" strikes prohibited as secondary boycott); 'Linden Lumber
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The examples of public intervention previously discussed, such
as the judicial role in administering the collective bargaining con-
tract, generally involve governmental regulation of both manage-
ment and labor. Any claim that such developments favor one side
or the other can only be proved by reference to some extra-legal or
ideological factor. In the short-run, at least, these legal develop-
ments purport to impose equally on both sides. The category of
public interventions now under discussion, however, acts directly
against the interests of one of the parties-labor-for the purpose of
depriving that side of weapons it previously employed in the free
play of collective bargaining.
Direct public intervention against one party contravenes the
overriding initial premise of collective bargaining theory that the
public has no interest in any particular contract outcome, but only
an interest in maintaining a sparsely regulated bargaining process.198
Such intervention, particularly by judges, should be doubly suspect
to the liberal mind because it appears so uncomfortably similar to
the ignominious pattern of suppressing unions through the labor
injunction and antitrust adjudication. 199 Because it is somewhat
inconsistent with the overall ideology of labor law, such interven-
tion requires special justification. The rhetoric has been exceed-
ingly inflated. For present purposes the most interesting device is
to appeal to the conscience of a fictional "public" or "community"
in order to legitimate the public promotion of private, partisan
interests.
A classic example is provided by Professor Cox's justification
of the decisions removing section 7 protection from slow-downs,
concerted refusals to work overtime, unannounced work-stoppages
and other "disruptive" tactics. One could argue that concerted
midcontract interruptions of the production process are contrary
to the national interest, a point of view that invites debate. Instead
Cox writes, without citation, that "[s]uch decisions reflect an ap-
Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 306 (1974) (increased risks in recognitional strikes
due to ruling that picket-line majority does not give rise to duty to bargain);
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (enjoinability of
safety strikes); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)
(revival of the labor injunction against grievance strikes).
198 See supra text accompanying notes 137-49.
199 Cf. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting):
The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in
it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. But
it is not for judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it
their function to set the limits of permissible contest and to declare the
duties which the new situation demands.
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parently deep-seated community sentiment . .- . [T]here can be
little doubt of the general public condemnation of occupying a job
and taking pay while simultaneously refusing to perform the serv-
ices required." 200
Similarly, in explaining the proscription of secondary boycotts
a leading textbook on collective bargaining remarks that
the Taft-Hartley Act abandoned the notion that law has
no role to play in the handling of labor disputes....
• . .Nevertheless, the points at which the Taft-Hartley
Act revives legal intervention into everyday disputes are
trivial in comparison to those it leaves untouched. Also,
the law intrudes only in areas where the overwhelming
consensus of opinion condemns the unlawful conduct.2 1'
Here again a decision to deprive a private participant in the "free"
collective bargaining process of a crucial weapon is justified in the
name of an illusory moral sentiment of an illusory community,
rather than by more candidly acknowledging the obvious point that
using public power to structure the private ordering process always
has a differential impact on private needs and interests. It is par-
ticularly ironic that a diffuse notion of communal moral sentiment,
rather than a more pointed reference to the antilabor policies of
the Congress that enacted Taft-Hartley, is invoked to justify sup-
pression of the secondary boycott. This is a tactic that in many
situations can succeed only by an appeal to employees and/or con-
sumers to put aside their immediate self-interest and convenience
in the name of solidarity. That is, to an unusual degree the tactic
requires an appeal to authentic communal bonds.
D. The Logic of Postwar Public Expansionism
This part concludes by examining the pressures within and
around the collective bargaining system that produced an evolution
from the private ordering orientation of the 1930s to today's more
public interventionist model. In particular, the focus will be on
explaining the dramatic alteration of the public/private boundary
line with respect to employer responses to day-to-day grievances.
The review that follows suggests a general tension within the
2 0 0 Cox, supra note 16, at 338. Compare the rhetoric cited in the text with a
more candid alternative explanation Cox provides for the slowdown decisions,
namely that slowdowns and similar tactics are simply too effective to permit workers
to have such weapons in their bargaining arsenal. Id. 338-39; see supra note 16.
201 A. Cox, D. Bor. & R. GoR _A r, supra note 130, at 93.
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public/private distinction that renders it inherently unstable and
therefore at all times prone to evolutionary transformation. On
particular issues, private actors may perceive an ad hoc interest in
appealing to public power so as to reinforce their position within
the private sphere. Private actors are thus frequently torn between
a desire generally to preserve the public/private separation, on the
one hand, and recurring "short-run" reasons to disturb it, on the
other. This tension combines with external social forces to generate
a continuous evolutionary process in public/private discpurse.
As discussed above,20 2 prewar collective bargaining theorists
navigated carefully between the Scylla of public control of the
employment relationship and the Charybdis of total "deregulation."
The theoretical difficulty was to justify some measure of public
regulation of the workplace while stopping well short of anything
resembling administrative determination of working conditions. A
solution to this difficulty was found in developing a modernized
principle of contractualism as the foundation of workplace justice.
203
The model of private contract was adhered to even during World
War II, when pursuant to executive order 204 and statute 205 the
federal government had extraordinary powers, including an effective
power to make substantive decisions regarding terms and conditions
of employment. Once collective bargaining became widespread
and the contract became the central focus of collective bargaining,
attention centered on the mechanisms of contract enforcement.
Success in developing these mechanisms has made aspects of the
collective bargaining contract quite attractive to management, ac-
counting in part for the extent to which American employers have
become reconciled to collective bargaining. 20
6
Today the collective contract is primarily administered through
arbitration, with an underlying regime of court enforcement for
special situations. This was not true before World War II, when
the arbitral system as we now know it did not exist.207 Nor were
the courts the primary locus of prewar collective contract enforce-
ment, although the collective contract was legally enforceable. Such
202 See supra text accompanying notes 137-53.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 180-82. See generally Klare, supra
note 84, at 293-336.
204Exec. Order No. 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (1938-1943 compilation), reprinted
in 9 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 945 (1943).
205 See, e.g., Economic Stabilization Act, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (1942) (expired
1944); War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943) (expired 1947).
206 See generally Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agree-
2nent, 61 CALIF. L. Rzv. 663, 720-24, 760-71 (1973).
207 See id. 745-47.
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contracts were enforced primarily through self-help.208  The slow-
down and strike were the union's tools, and discipline and the lock-
out were management's in a continuing process of contract admin-
istration through power-conflict.
During the war, the right to strike was legally curtailed, and
in any event the labor movement had pledged not to strike. It was
therefore politically desirable for the War Labor Board to provide
an alternative to conflict-resolution through self-help. That alter-
native was binding arbitration, which became virtually mandatory
under the encouragement and directives of the War Labor Board.2
0 9
An enormous strike wave erupted when the war ended,210 un-
leashing years of pent-up energy and anger at controlled wages and
unresolved grievances, and shortly thereafter Taft-Hartley was en-
acted. Taft-Hartley reflected both a sharp rightward turn in the
political climate and the triumph of a long-term effort by employers,
delayed by the war, to reverse the processes set in motion by the
Wagner Act and the rise of the CIO. It was clear, however, that
the clock could not be set back before 1985. The political reality
of the immediate postwar years was that the spread of unionization
might be arrested and contained but that the major collective bar-
gaining relationships were too firmly entrenched to be dislodged.
Accordingly, attention was again focused on the means of admin-
istering the collective contract. In this context an extraordinarily
gifted generation of liberal labor lawyers, judges, professional arbi-
trators, management theorists, and law teachers devoted their ener-
gies to developing a model of collective bargaining that could both
commend itself to the labor movement and earn a measure of re-
conciliation from American employers. Naturally the grievance
arbitration procedures that had impressed so many labor leaders
and managers during the war were destined to be central to this
model.2 11
In a nutshell, the leading postwar labor law issue became how
to make contractualism work effectively. From the employers'
208 Id. 745.
209 Id. 746-47.
210 In fact, the war years themselves witnessed a staggering amount of strike
activity, notwithstanding labor's no-strike pledge. See Green, Fighting on Two
Fronts: Working Class Militancy in the 1940's, RADIc l ALM., July-Aug. 1975, at 7,
7-21. See also Lynd, supra note 173, at 415 & n.106.
211 Although query whether employees were equally impressed. See supra
note 210. Note that professional arbitrators, many of whom got their -start as such
under the aegis of the War Labor Board, also pushed for a collective bargaining
model centered on arbitration. See generally Beeferman, Labor Arbitration in the
Post-War Era: Concepts, Institution, and Consciousness 3-17 (June 1977) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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standpoint the key problem was to achieve efficient and durable
enforcement of the no-strike provisions of collective bargaining
agreements 22 and thereby to obtain uninterrupted production
during the term of the contract.213 Management wanted to pre-
serve the benefits it derived from private ordering-for example,
minimal governmental scrutiny of working conditions and minimal
compulsory bargaining with respect to managerial decisionmaking.
At the same time management wanted greater public intervention
so as to deny unions a crucial component of what they had gained
from the privatized, "deregulated" 1930s labor-management process,
namely the right and/or effective power to strike over midcontract
grievances.
Leading commentators decried the notion of relying on the
judiciary to enforce collective bargaining agreements. The most
famous was the outstanding arbitrator and law teacher Harry Shul-
man, who pointedly suggested that the "law stay out .... .214 It
followed from his perspective that when the parties' autonomous
rule of law and private negotiations failed to resolve disputes, resort
had to be allowed, however reluctantly, to self-help: "When their
autonomous system breaks down, might not the parties better be
left to the usual methods for adjustment of labor disputes rather
than to court actions on the contract or on the arbitration award?" 215
However, the pressure was overwhelming to take another road
than Shulman's. A foremost priority of mainstream labor law in
the postwar period became to enlist the law in the task of suppress-
ing midcontract grievance strikes. Employers and liberal theorists
embarked on the venture of mobilizing public power (notably that
of the federal courts in section 301 cases) 216 in order to protect
212 The primary purpose of LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1976), was
to serve this goal. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WEr.Lxn, supra
note 181, at 15-18 (legislative history of § 301 focuses on a variety of legal impedi-
ments to enforcement of collective contracts in the state courts).
213 See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFAIE, supra note 181, at
16 ("[t]he chief advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a col-
lective labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of
the agreement").
214 Shulman, supra note 189, at 1024. Shulman wrote:
When the [arbitration system] works fairly well, it does not need the
sanction of the law of contracts or the law of arbitration. It is only when
the system breaks down completely that the courts' aid in these respects
is invoked. But the courts cannot, by occasional sporadic decision, re-
store the parties' continuing relationship; and their intervention in such
cases may seriously affect the going systems of self-government.
Id.
215 Id.
216 See supra note 212. Statutory change was also important. Section 8(d)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), inserted by the Taft-Hartley amend-
private rights (the benefit to employers of no-strike clauses) by
elevating such private rights to a superior position over employees'
public rights (notably the statutory right to concerted activity for
mutual aid).
The other side of the coin is that labor too had something to
gain, or so its leaders believed, from bringing the law "in" to the
labor-management process. If for practical, legal, and/or political
reasons self-help was no longer viable as the chief means of contract
enforcement, then strengthening the alternative system of grievance
arbitration was absolutely essential in order to provide workers a
measure of industrial due process during the contract term. From
labor's standpoint the arbitral system compared favorably to the
judicial process. Arbitration was perceived as much more informal
and accessible than the courts, and much more responsive to the
values of industrial democracy and the special needs of industrial
parties. Because its flexibility and responsiveness made it attractive
to labor, those interested in labor-management reconciliation natu-
rally underscored the autonomy of arbitration in constructing their
ideal model of collective bargaining.
Curiously, some proponents of the arbitration system saw a need
to bring law "in" precisely in order to save arbitration from the law.
Conservative courts, which did not appreciate or approve the some-
times counterintuitive norms of arbitral law, threatened the au-
tonomy and vitality of the system by excessive interference.21 It
was thought that only a dramatic intervention emanating' from a
preeminent source of law could arrest the corrosive intrusion of
the lower courts and thereby preserve the "autonomous" arbitration
system. A second great priority of postwar labor law was, therefore,
to find that source of law and to establish its hegemony. Labor
union lawyers and liberal theorists embarked on the venture of
mobilizing public power (notably that of the federal courts in
section 301 cases) in order to protect private interests (an autono-
mous arbitration system based to a significant degree on industrial
and party-controlled norms, rather than legalistic and externally
ments, makes it unlawful for a union to strike during the term of a collective bar-
gaining contract when the objective is to "terminate or modify" the contract.
However, the § 8(d) prohibition"does not apply when the union's strike protests
employer action which the union in good faith and with colorable basis asserts is
in violation of the contract." R. GoRMAN, supra note 37, at 423. That is, the
no-strike provisions of § 8(d) do not apply to grievance strikes. This is why the
enforcement of contractual no-strike guarantees under § 301 became so important.
217The leading case was International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer,
inc., 271 A.D. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd. mem., 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464
(1947) (court interprets collective contract in ruling on motion to compel
arbitration).
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imposed norms) by elevating this private arbitration system to a
central place in public policy.
218
As can be seen, both employers and unions perceived convinc-
ing reasons to invoke public regulatory power to reinforce their
interests, although not only management but labor as well remained
wary of public intervention in the private arena of labor-manage-
ment affairs. Sophisticated legal thinkers and advocates gradually
worked out a "package" of legal reforms that appeared to advance
some of the interests of both sides.219  As the elements of the pack-
age gradually unfolded, an integrated vision of the collective bar-
gaining process emerged and was in large part adopted as law. The
intellectual power of this synthesis and the convergence of party-
interest around an enhanced role for public law helped generate
the pressures toward public expansionism so evident in postwar
labor law.
The basic package 220 involved a tradeoff: the employer agreed
to submit midcontract disputes to binding arbitration, and the
union committed itself to a legally enforceable no-strike obliga-
tion.2 2 1  The idea of promoting this tradeoff in order to suppress
218 See supra text accompanying notes 24-30; cf. supra text accompanying
note 216.
219 It is not suggested that only labor was interested in the arbitration side of
the no-strike/arbitration tradeoff. The most sophisticated management thinkers
developed a theory in which the "web of rules" flowing from the continuous griev-
ance arbitration process is treated as an essential component of management control
in the workplace. This point is developed at some length in Mare, supra note 3,
459-65 (citing literature). However, the interests of individual, rank-and-file em-
ployees were not closely attended to in the development of this synthesis.
220 The compressed nature of this presentation regrettably suggests a conspiracy,
or at any rate implies that the lawyers and academics who promoted the "package"
possessed a high degree of self-consciousness and foresight about what they were
doing. This overtone is not intended. On the contrary, the ideas comprising the
package were developed slowly and erratically, in fits and starts. A few of those
involved may have understood and subscribed to all the major tenets of the
tradeoff. Perhaps the best example is Justice Douglas. But many or even most
participants in the legal developments described here did not support the entire
package nor did they necessarily perceive all of its implications. For an interesting
and detailed discussion of the intellectual history of the period, see generally
Beeferman, supra note 211. Accordingly, references to the "package" or to an
integrated vision of the collective bargaining process point not to an explicit pro-
gram of an identifiable faction but to the unfolding logic and overall structure of
legal thought about collective bargaining problems during this time.
221 This arrangement is often called a "quid pro quo." See, e.g., Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). However, this terminology is highly misleading.
See generally Lynd, supra note 173, at 410-23. "Quid pro quo" connotes an equal
exchange, but the basic tradeoff under discussion is usually dramatically skewed
in management's favor for two reasons: (1) typically, the union's no-strike obliga-
tion is absolute during the term of the contract, whereas management agrees to
submit its decisions to arbitral revision only with respect to "arbitrable" matters
[Vol. 130:1358
LABOR'LAW
grievance strikes and bolster arbitration carried with it several spe-
cific theoretical and doctrinal implications. First, industrial peace
emerged as the most favored "value" underlying federal labor
policy. Other goals and values that the NLRA contained,22 2 such
as equality, industrial democracy, and self-organization, entered
relative eclipse as components of the national labor policy.223 Second,
it became a general principle that self-help is disfavored as a mode
of industrial dispute resolution. 224  Concerted activity and self-
organization by workers tend no longer to be prized for their own
sake, as in themselves some sort of contribution to democracy in this
hierarchic and bureaucratic world. Third, a price of reconciling
employers to collective bargaining was that unions undertake the
role of "trustees" of industrial peace and "responsible behavior." 225
(i.e., those not retained as managerial prerogative); and (2) in the event of dis-
pute about the meaning of the contract, managements version almost always pre-
vails during the pendency of the arbitral process. Id. 416-23. See also F. Euaoulu
-& E. ELKOURI, supra note 43, at 154-59, 671 (fundamental rule of arbitral law re-
quires employees to obey management's allegedly improper commands while resort-
ing to the grievance procedure). For these reasons the terms "tradeoff" and
"package" have been substituted here for the traditional phrase "quid pro quo."
The postwar package included other elements, not discussed here, besides
the no-strike/arbitration tradeoff. An example is the gradual acceptance of union
security and the dues checkoff, despite the Taft-Hartley restrictions in this area.
Also not discussed: are some of the underlying assumptions of the package, such
as the continued existence of an expanding economy. The postwar collective bar-
gaining synthesis is now unraveling under pressure from both external forces (eco-
nomid distress, international economic competition, and pressure from employees
aggrieved by the continuing failure of the collective bargaining system adequately
to address such urgent social problems as equal employment opportunity, health
care, and retirement security), and internal tensions (the hierarchy and bureau-
cratism of the collective bargaining system, and its suppression of worker concerted
activity).
222 See generally M~are, supra note 84, at 281-85.
223 Id. 292-93; cf. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) ("[the § 7 rights of employees] are protected not
for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing
industrial strife").
224 See generally Klare, supra note 3, at 452-68.
225 See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d 467, 479
(3d Cir. 1978):
[Unions] simply must bear certain obligations if [they are] to continue
to be entitled to the rights and benefits accorded by our national labor
policy. To the extent that any union . .. refuses to enforce appropriately
authorized union discipline upon recalcitrant members [for engaging, e.g.,
in wildcat strikes] . .. that union can be said to have abrogated a pro-
portion of valued rights granted to the union under our national labor
policy.
(Republic Steel held that an international union may be vicariously 'liable for
damages caused by an unlawful sympathy strike of local union members, if the
international fails to exhaust all reasonable means to halt the strike. This holding
was effectively overruled by Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S.
912 (1979).)
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What -unions had to bargain with was the promise of uninterrupted
production. Both so as to avoid section 301 liability and, as a
practical matter, to have something of value to sell at the bargaining
table, unions found themselves saddled with major responsibility
for enforcement of the no-strike clause.
22 6
On the doctrinal level, proponents of the tradeoff had a com-
plex message to get across.22 7 To begin with, they had to counter
Dean Shulman's warnings 22 8 and to pave the way for the law to
"enter" the arbitral process. A preeminent, uniform source of law
was needed to overcome the weaknesses of state court enforcement
of collective bargaining contracts. 2 9 A first order of business was
therefore to establish section 301 as a flexible and paramount source
of federal law for collective contract enforcement. This was ac-
complished in Lincoln Mills.30 A related task, accomplished soon
thereafter, was to make the federal common law of the collective
226 It is of course true that the leading union lawyers urged the courts to
buttress the arbitral system without necessarily conceding the tradeoff corollary of
judicially strengthened enforcement of the no-strike obligation. Nonetheless the
theories with which union lawyers elected to educate the courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, did provide intellectual groundwork for both sides of the tradeoff
coin, and in this sense union lawyers bear some of the responsibility for the
courts' adoption of the entire package, particularly for the result in the Boys
Markets injunction case, Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970). See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
227 This complexity suggests a hypothesis about why the liberal ideologues of
collective bargaining, in this case most notably Justice Douglas, campaigned with
such vigor to establish the principle that § 301 authorizes the federal courts to de-
velop and promulgate a preemptive federal common law of the collective bargaining
contract. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)
(Douglas, J.) ("the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws ....
The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the prob-
lem"). The intricacy and sophistication of the tradeoff proponents' message re-
quired that they target a relatively small, accessible group of decisionmakers, sus-
ceptible to education by elite academics and other notables. The federal judiciary
fit this role nicely, much better than Congress. The federal judiciary was also
a particularly congenial audience for the tradeoff proponents because, unlike Con-
gress, it could be counted on to undercut the Norris-LaGuardia Act by a process
of creating exceptions to it. See infra text accompanying notes 240-42. That
Justice Frankfurter understood this, see generally F. FRANxFOIrTER & N. GREENE,
supra note 146, probably contributed to the bitterness of his dissent in Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
228 See supra text accompanying note 214.
229 Some of the weaknesses of state court enforcement had to do with pro-
cedural matters (e.g., whether or not a union could be sued as an entity) that were
dealt with in section 301 itself. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) (union may
be sued as an entity). However, many substantive problems requiring judge-made
solutions remained. For example, in some states-including Alabama, where
Lincoln Mills arose-executory agreements to arbitrate disputes were not specifically
enforceable. See generally Cox, supra note 148, at 247-48.
230 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Douglas, J.).
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contract preemptive for choice-of-law purposes,231 while holding the
state courts available for the job of contract enforcement.
232
A second problem for tradeoff proponents was to ensure that
when the law "came in," it did so only to the limited extent necessary.
In particular, judicial intervention in aid of arbitration would be
counterproductive unless it were as unobtrusive and deferential as
possible to the autonomy of arbitration. The key theme, repeated
over and over again, was that the judicial and arbitral processes
ought to be mutually reinforcing: "[In contrast to Dean Shulman,
others] have urged that both the institutions of self-government
proliferated by collective bargaining and the surrounding legal sys-
tem can gain strength from mutual support provided .. .that the
law achieves a workable division of authority between the arbitra-
tion and the courts." 
233
To the end of achieving a "workable division of authority,"
proponents of the tradeoff were obliged simultaneously to argue
that the arbitral system needed the assistance of the courts and that
arbitration was so unique a method of conflict resolution that the
courts ought not get involved in its routine operation. Ironically,
in supporting this second branch of their argument, advocates
turned to precisely those special features of arbitration that Shul
man and others had identified in counseling that the law "stay
out." They produced a burgeoning literature on the uniqueness
of arbitration: its frequent reference to past practice and other
extra-documentary sources of norms; its on-going role in maintaiin-
231 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962)
("incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal labor
law" in § 301 cases).
232 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (§ 301 does not
disturb the pre-existing jurisdiction of the state courts to enforce collective bargain-
ing contracts).
233 Cox, supra note 148, at 247; cf. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement,
69 Hanv. L. 1Ev. 601, 604-05 (1956) ("Both the new institutions of industrial
self-government and the surrounding legal system can gain strength from mutual
support. Labor, management, and arbitrators must recognize that the ideals and
needs of society limit their freedom of decision; but the accommodation also re-
quires infusing labor law with many of the ideas and conventions, unknown to the
law but appropriate to group action; which have gained fcceptance in the world
of labor relations.") (citation omitted); Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitra-
tion, in THE PRoFEssioN OF LABoR AmrrnATION: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
FIRST SEvEx ANNuAL MEETINGS OF THE NATONAL ACADEMY OF ARITRATORS
1948-1954, at 76, 78 (J. McKelvey ed. 1957) ("The attitude of both courts and
agencies towards the growing jurisprudence of labor arbitration will be deeply in-
fluenced by the attitude of arbitrators towards the law. Each can best secure
respect for its appropriate jurisdiction by recognizing the proper role of the other.")
Professor Cox's theory of the "mutually supportive" role of courts and arbitra-
tors represents an important application of the then-flourishing theory of "institu-
tional competencies." See generally H. HAT & A. SAcKS, THE LEGAL ITOes
(tent. ed. 1958).
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ing the production- process (as opposed merely to case-by-case dis-
pute settlement}; its remedial latitude and ingenuity; its infor-
mality; its cathartic functions; its involvement of lay people; and
so on.234 The key to the uniqueness of arbitration, according to
this view, is that it is not just a dispute-resolution process: it is an
aspect of the system of industrial governance, of the management
process. 235. It was therefore a crucial proviso of the "law/arbitration
mutual support" idea that the judiciary be instructed on the highest
authority that "legal rights and duties under a collective bargaining
agreement are not imposed by conventional legal rules but are
drawn out of the institutions of the industrial relations and shaped
to their needs." 236 This instruction was eventually delivered in
the Steelworkers Trilogy.237
A third problem for tradeoff proponents was presented by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.238 Norris-LaGuardia stands for the propo-
sition that even-if certain conduct is improper (for instance, a strike
in violation of a contract), federal courts may not enjoin traditional
kinds of worker activity, notably peaceful strikes and picketing.
Needless to say, adherence to this principle threatened to obstruct the
aspect of the package deal that promised employers efficient enforce-
ment of no-strike obligations. One of the boldest strokes of the
tradeoff proponents was, therefore, to declare the Norris-LaGuardia
Act obsolete. 239 To its enormous credit the Supreme Court balked
at this one, at least at first.240 Eventually the Court obliged in
the watershed Boys Markets case,23' holding that Norris-LaGuardia
does not bar injunctions against strikes over arbitrable grievances
when the collective bargaining contract at issue contains a no-strike
234 See generally Cox, Reflection& upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAnv. L. REv.
1482 (1959).
235 See generally Feller, supra note 206, at 718-71 (usefulness of grievance
arbitration to management).
236 Cox, supra note 148, at 247.
237 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
(Douglas, J.) (judicial deference to arbitration); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (Douglas, J.) (same); United Steel-
vorkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (Douglas, J.) (same).
238 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
239 See Cox, supra note 148, at 254 ("[tlo an undefined extent the Norris-
LaGuardia Act has become an anachronism").
24OSinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (§ 301 does not im-
pliedly repeal Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibition on injunctions against peaceful
strikes).
241 Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (§ 301 partially
repeals Norris-LaGuardia Act anti-injunction prohibitions by implication; strikes over
arbitrable grievances in violation of contractual no-strike clauses may be enjoined
ly federal courts).
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clause and a mandatory arbitration procedure. This decision com-
pleted the package by, in effect, partially repealing the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
Many labor union lawyers accept Boys Markets, however- re-
luctantly, as a necessary consequence of a labor law regime that
protects many valuable rights of unions and employees. Others,
the author of this Article included, regard the decision as a pro-
found betrayal of the promise of New Deal labor law reform.
Either way, Boys Markets undoubtedly represents the triumph of
liberal postwar collective bargaining theory.242 Moreover, it em-
bodies the supreme irony of an appeal to public necessity and the
reintroduction of an historically much reviled form of public inter-
vention, all in the name of nurturing the parties' private dispute-
resolution system. It is consistent with the logic of a system that
executes national labor policy by elevating private contractual rights
over the statutory, public law rights of employees.u43
Perhaps the story of the postwar tradeoff encapsulates some old
Legal Realist lessons, namely that "private ordering" presupposeIs
that public power has established a regime of rules and enforcement
agencies, that the "unregulated" market is a fiction, and that private
ordering is itself a mode of public regulation. The saga of Boys
Markets is eloquent testimony to the proposition that no private
ordering system is autonomous, or, to put it another way, that, the
notion of a public/private distinction is incoherent. Boys Markets
teaches that the very idea of "autonomy," in this and other contexts,
must be reformulated in a way that transcends the public/private
dichotomy.
III. THE IDEOLOGICAL FUNcTIONS OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE
RHETORIC IN LABOR LAW
Legal thought within the liberal tradition is caught in -a
dilemma. On the one hand, work in this mode appears incapable
242 This point is developed in Kare, supra note 180, at 47-54. Cf. Feller,
supra note 206, at 714 n.252 ("[the result in Boys Market [sic] was in a very
real sense a consequence of Lincoln Mills and the [Steelworkers] trilogy").
243 See supra text accompanying notes 212-16. Note that § 7 rights to engage
in concerted activity are rights of employees, not unions. See 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976). Unions are empowered to "waive" employees' rights to concerted activity
by granting the employer a contractual no-strike clause. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (strike in breach of contractual no-strike clause is un-
protected under § 7). Sands Mfg. is venerable precedent for the proposition men-
tioned, although the contract at issue in that case did not contain a no-strike clause.
The law does not require unions to obtain employee ratification of contracts, al-
though union constitutional provisions or bylaws requiring ratification may be
legally enforceable.
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of jettisoning the intellectual apparatus associated with the public/
private distinction and several similar contrasts, such as those be-
tween group and individual, form and substance, thought and con-
duct, state and civil society, and so on.244 This series of conceptual
categories is invested with powerful ideological significance. On
the other hand, the effort to construct a vision of social life with
these- categories is constantly threatened by the eroding power of
experience, which perversely refuses to be cabined within this
framework. 245
The typical liberal response to this dilemma is ever-renewed
effort to refract- the complexities of social life through the basic
conceptual prism comprising the set of fundamental dualities like
public/private. To a significant degree liberal legal discourse has
become an intellectual practice designed to generate images of the
world conducing to a belief that one can meaningfully conceive of
the realm of social and economic intercourse apart from the realm
of politics. The endeavor to preserve the ideological power of the
basic distinctions, even though every attempt to think about the
world in such categories threatens to explode them, has generated
many strained and contorted formulations. It has also, however,
yielded some surprisingly imaginative and subtle recastings. The
treatment of public and private in modem collective bargaining
theory is an example of the latter kind.26
244 Cf. Frug, supra note 32, at 1075 ("Liberalism is not a single formula for
interpreting the world; it is, instead, a view based on seeing the world as a series
of complex dualities") , (mentioning reason/desire, fact/value, freedom/necessity,
self/community, civil society/state, and empirical fact/ideas).
245 The courts occasionally acknowledge that the public/private distinction is
problematical as a description of modem social life. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 178 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("it is no longer
possible, if it ever was, to believe that a sharp line can be drawn between private
and public actions") (footnotes omitted); see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring):
Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and
private sectors are blurred. Since the depression of the 1930's and World
War II there has been a rapid fusion of economic and political power, a
merging of science, industry, and government, and a high degree of inter-
action between the intellectual, governmental, and business worlds ...
While these trends and events have occasioned a consolidation of govern-
mental power, power has also become much more organized in what we
have commonly considered to be the private sector. In many situations,
policy determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal
political institutions are now originated and implemented through a com-
plex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and asso-
ciations, some only loosely connected with the Government,
. 246 Collective bargaining theory is all the more remarkable because it has
contended with the fact that the practice of collective bargaining poses serious
problems for our ordinary ways of thinking about the public/private distinction. A
crucial development in twentieth century American life has been the expansion and
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The essence of the public/private distinction is the conviction
that it ispossible to conceive of social and economic life apart from
government and law, indeed that it is impossible or dangerous'to
conceive of it any other way. The core ideological function served
by the public/private distinction is to deny that the practices com-
prising the private sphere of life-the worlds of business, education
and culture, the community, and the family-are inextricably linked
to and at least partially constituted by politics and law.2 Denying
the role of politics-the processes by which communities organize
and institutionalize their self-directive capacities-in constituting
the forms and structure of social life is a way of impeding access to
an understanding of the role of human agency in constructing the
world. The primary effect of the public/private distinction is thus
to inhibit the perception that the institutions in which we live are
the product of human design and can therefore be changed. 4 8
In the labor context, the paradigmatic form of this sort of
conceptual repression is the belief that employees lack the capacity
collectively to organize and govern complex industrial enterprises.
The fundamental tenet of democratic politics, that human com-
munities are capable of fashioning appropriate institutions for guid-
ing their destinies, is not applied in the American workplace.
Rather, participants in the community of work must be made to
believe that industry and commerce can only function on a largely
authoritarian basis, and the public/private distinction is used to
explain why the basic principles of democracy do not apply in the
workplace. The distinction is also used to induce consent to
hierarchy by disguising it and by fostering the appearance of em-
ployee participation.
An example combining both roles of the public/private dis-
tinction is the central premise of collective bargaining theory that
primacy of corporate entities whose inteinal procedures and external contractual
relationships constitute a species of lawmaking. This has involved the rise of
rights-holding and power-wielding entities intermediate between government and.
the individual, that is, between "public" and "private" as traditionally conceived.
See Frug, supra note 32, at 1128-41. See generally Jaffe, supra note 136; Kessler,
supra note 136. Collective bargaining between big capital and big labor is a
paradigmatic expression of the phenomenon of lawmaking by private groups.
247This theme is pursued in Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, TELos, Summer
1979, at 123-35.
248For further discssion see Frug, supra note 32, at 1074-80. See also id-
1121 (liberal "ideas have organized people's perception of the world and therefore
their perception of which goals have been possible and desirable to achieve. In
this way, they have influenced people's actions and, thereby, limited [their] insti-
tutional possibilities"); Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017
(1981); Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YArL L.J. 1275
(1981).
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the industrial rule of law is the "autonomous" creation of labor
and management. This proposition suggests that democratic politi-
cal processes ought not to meddle in industrial relations and should
leave existing economic hierarchies in place. It denies the crucial
role of public law in establishing and protecting the "autonomous"
industrial rule of law. The "autonomy" formula also implies,
however, that through unions employees have already participated
in constructing the industrial status quo, a point that is all the more
convincing because it contains an-important element of truth. On
the other hand, the formulation also legitimates existing arrange-
ments and deflects scrutiny from the question whether they can or
should be altered- so as to increase employee'control over the insti-
tutions that dominate their working lives.
The thesis of this Article is that the public/private distinction
is continuously invoked refined, and reformulated in labor law in
connection with the effort to induce the belief that workers should
be denied power and participation in industrial life. In particular,
public/private thinking has significant implications for three issues:
popular control of investment decisions; worker control of the labor
process; and the place of the individual in union governance.
A. Social Control of Private Power: Worker Control of
Investment Decisions
Those seeking to impose the democratic norms of participation,
fairness, communal responsibility, and respect for the individual
upon those exercising social and economic power would have an
easier battle if the starting point of discussion were that there is no
such thing as "private" power because government is implicated in
and partially responsible for the prevailing structure of wealth and
domination.2 9 The public/private distinction conveys the impres-
sion that the social structure of domination is natural, at least inso-
far as it was "there first," "before" the actions of government, and it
thereby impedes the moral imagination. It makes it more difficult
for us to conceive of a world in which it is deemed unacceptable
to exercise power over others unconstrained by participatory norms,
regard for the community, and respect for the dignity of the in-
dividual. The most important example of this problem in the
labor law context is the mobilization of public/private rhetoric to
justify employer control of investment and resource-allocation de-
249 Cf. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) (early




cisions of societal consequence-in a word, to justify private owner-
ship of the means of production.2"
B. Participation and Self-Governance: Worker Control
of the Labor Process
By positing a "private" domain of life that is not presumptively
constrained by democratic norms, the public/private dichotomy
induces us to think of the promise of freedom as residing only in
the part of life that is presumptively amenable to collective -self-
regulation, the polity. This in turn induces us to conceive of free-
dom in a singular manner-as a particular -relationship to state
power. That is, public/private rhetoric tends to channel demo-
cratic aspirations into the framework of individualistic rights theory.
Public/private rhetoric thereby inhibits us from embracing
alternative conceptions, such as the view that freedom is in part
the development of the capacity for communal self-governance
across the entire existential space of life. The potential and need
to participate in organizing the social world and guiding its future
is a generic human capacity. The nature of our species embraces
the aspiration toward collective self-governance, and our attain-
ment of it is a measure of our freedom. The public/private
distinction diminishes the potential for enhancing our capacities of
self-governance, not only in the workplace, but in the family, the
neighborhood, and the polity. In the labor law context, public/
private rhetoric supports a spectrum of doctrines designed to deny
worker participation in enterprise governance and to deny that the
workplace can be for employees a locus of personal and collective
realization, growth, and expression.251
C. Autonomy and Community: The Individual Employee
and Union Solidarity
Public/private, rhetoric conduces to the belief that the indi-
vidual and the community are radically distinct and antagonistic.
This way of thinking suppresses the truth that in significant measure
we are the ensemble of -our social relations and shared meanings,
and that our individuality is in many ways defined in relationship
to our shared meanings and symbols. Human fulfillment is im-
possible outside of and apart from communal life. Yet public/
private rhetoric teaches that community is necessarily a threat. to
250 See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text. -
251 See, e.g., supra notes 16-22, 46, 48, 75-77 & 123-27 and accompanying text.
See generally Klare, supra note 180. - -
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autonomy, that liberty and equality are necessarily at odds. That
is, public/private rhetoric inhibits us from regarding self-governed
group life as a wellspring of personal growth and fulfillment.
The liberal tradition and its derivative, predominantly indi-
vidualistic theories of legal rights almost universally deny the pos-
sibility that group life as an end in itself might be enriching for
the individual. 52  This denial places all groups or institutions
intermediate between the state and individual, such as unions, uni-
versities, and cities, in a precarious theoretical position, and poses
an intractable dilemma for liberal politics. This dilemma is deftly
articulated by Professor Frug:
[I]t is a paradox that while liberalism can be understood
as an attempt to eradicate group power in favor of that of
the individual and the state, most liberal thinkers seem
convinced that the creation of a world without any inter-
mediate bodies-a world in which the state is the only
power wielder other than individuals themselves-would
leave individuals powerless to prevent a centralized state
from threatening their liberty ...
. . . The exercise of state power infringes individual
rights protected by independent corporations, yet the exer-
cise of corporate power infringes individual rights pro-
tected by the state. Every time we seek state help to
protect us from a corporate invasion of our rights, we
strengthen one threat to our liberty at the expense of an-
other; yet every time we prevent the state from protecting
us against corporate power, we accomplish the same result
* . . Independent group power is simply not an idea,
whether clothed in the name of rights or sovereignty, that
can be defended within a liberal legal system against
liberal attack.2
3
This framework effectively disallows the possibility that the indi-
vidual's potential for self-realization can be enhanced by strengthen-
252 The guarantee in NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) of the right of employees
to "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection" is perhaps the most important exception to this generalization in
American law. See generally Lynd, supra note 3, at 494-95. No doubt this is
why § 7 is so brutally disfavored in judicial and administrative interpretation. See
supra notes 196-97.
253 Frug, supra note 32, at 1122-25 (footnotes omitted).
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ing group solidarity, and it. thereby precludes -alternative :visions of
freedom. This. point has two ramifications in the labor law con-.
text. The first is that liberal collective bargaining law makes it
seem implausible that the union can function .as a. locus of group
life and public discourse.2 4 Union activity is conceived primarily
in instrumental terms, not as a collective experience for employees
in the emancipatory project of becoming the authors.of their own
destinies. This reinforces all the other pressures in the political
culture that breed hierarchical and. apolitical unions "concerned
about a narrow range of economic issues. - 5 Second, with some
important exceptions, .the public/private distinction imposes an
intolerable choice in the context of most union democracy'litigation.
That choice is between allowing unions and dissenting employees
to harm one another and permitting the government t6 intrude
into union affairs as a byproduct of, preventing such harm. In con-
temporary employee-union litigation, workers often look to state
intervention to protect them from abuses of union power,256 while
unions simultaneously look to the state for protection.- from the
fragmenting effects of individial emp oye% dissent. 57 . The prob-
lems of the duty of fair representation, members' speech and election
rights, and union security cannot be satisfactorily resolved, however,
unless we can articulate and gain acceptance for a new conception
of worker participation in unions as fulfillment through collective,
self-governed experience.28
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article is informed by a belief in the possibility and de-
sirability of a mode of self-governed group life that is an alternative
to liberal democratic theories that fracture social life between
public and private domains. Such theories do not fully account for
the social context of human experience and therefore cannot ade-
quately appreciate the social. determinants of human freedom.
24 Some exceptions to this claim are noted in Mare, supra note 3, at 472 and
472 n.81.
255 For discussion of legal doctrines tending to reinforce unions' apolitical
stance, see supra notes 72-79, 184-85 & 191-93 and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Cloke, Political Loyalty, Labor Democracy and the Constitution, 5 SAN
Fmw. V.L. REv. 159 (1976) (role of law in fostering apolitical unions).
258 See, e.g., supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., supra notes 62-63 & 69-74 and accompanying text.
258Cf. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213, 221 (1972) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) ("[ulnion activity ... is group activity, and is grounded on
the notion that strength can be garnered from unity, solidarity, and mutual
commitment").
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The alternative conception of democracy values communal ex-
perience and responsibility more highly than does the individualism
so pronounced in the liberal tradition. It is a mistake, however, to
view this alternative theory as seeking to "strengthen the community
at the expense of the individual," as some might charge. The
theory aspires to enhance both individual autonomy and communal
solidarity, thereby displacing the inherent conflict between indi-
vidualism and collective control that informs the liberal perspec-
tive-and that corresponds to the public/private distinction. The
vision of solidarity advanced here is a vision of autonomy, of a form
of social life that nurtures the capacity of every individual to ex-
perience self-realization.
259
2 5 9 See H. MAcusE, AN EssAY oN LiBERA-nON 88 (1969):
[Slelf-determination begins at home-and that is with every I, and the
We whom the I chooses. And this end must indeed appear in the means
to attain it, that is to say, in the strategy of those who, within the exist-
ing society, work for the new one .... Exploitation in all its forms must
have disappeared from this fight: from the work relationships among the
fighters as well as from their individual relationships. Understanding,
tenderness toward each other, the instinctual consciousness of that which
is evil, false, the heritage of oppression, would then testify to the au-
thenticity of the rebellion.
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